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THESIS ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis seeks to demonstrate that Critical and Human Security approaches 
and perspectives – under conditions associated with the ‘globalisation of 
security’ and the ‘bifurcation of the security environment’ – should be 
increasingly influential in shaping New Zealand’s contemporary approach to 
Security.     
‘Security’ exists as a fundamental and legitimate quest for all Humankind. 
It is accepted as a core organising principle within societies, states and the 
international system, with efforts to preserve security central to the human 
condition. Critically though – within contemporary settings – the idea and 
concept of security is increasingly proving to be so weakly developed as to be 
inadequate for task. In the 21st Century, insecurity not only remains, but is 
intensifying globally. It is becoming one of the primary development 
challenges of our time, while today, one-and-a-half billion people continue to 
live in areas affected by social fragility, unrelenting competition, conflict and 
violence. The persistence of such alarming degrees of insecurity is partially 
symptomatic, and a consequence of the continuing prevalence of traditional 
state-centric notions of security. Such approaches are coming to be recognised 
for their increasingly narrow and reductionist focus on statist calculations of 
power; and notions of survival, sovereignty, threat and conflict. Crucially, they 
are proving ill-suited or inadequate to understanding, explaining and coping 
with the challenges of today’s transforming security environment.  
 
As a consequence, an increasing number of security of security scholars 
and practitioners are speaking to the emergence of a transformative evolution 
in contemporary security and insecurity. Such an evolution is founded upon a 
critical recognition that many of today’s security challenges are a consequence 
of the ‘globalisation of security’ and ‘bifurcation of the security environment.’ 
Under the conditions of globalisation and bifurcation, the resilience and utility 
of prevailing security ideas, institutions and practices can no longer be 
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assumed. Indeed, many of the emerging challenges to security are the result of 
forces outside the traditional framework of strategic analysis that have little to 
do with the exercise of power by competing nation-states, but everything to do 
with the stability of states and human survival. 
 
While traditional state-centric security discourses continue to maintain 
measures of relevance, such orthodoxies – while necessary – are a not wholly 
complete, adequate or sufficient means by which to understand and respond to 
today’s complex and interdependent security challenges. As this Thesis will 
demonstrate, profound changes in today’s security environment and agenda, 
and the corresponding need for effective responses to such, is prompting the 
re-consideration of security concepts and policies adopted in the past, while 
also providing a window of opportunity for the development of fresh 
approaches and concepts. In this respect, I will advance the position that 
Critical approaches and perspective to security – and specifically Human 
Security – accord the normative scope for reconceptualising contemporary 
security in more openly inclusive and progressively comprehensive ways. Such 
an objective is testimony to our living in a world more interdependent than 
ever before, wherein all states, societies and individuals depend much more on 
the acts of omissions of others for their security and even for their survival. 
Importantly here, given such circumstances, there is a need for a clearer 
articulation of the inherent relationship between traditional state-centric and 
critical-human security perspectives. In this sense, the notion of the ‘dialectic’ 
and ‘via media’ provides potential for the progressive development of an 
‘ideal-type’ approach to security that reconciles somewhat dissonant – if not 
inimical – state-centric and human-centric conceptions, while promising much 
in the way of addressing and alleviating insecurity and suffering. These 
themes, ideas and objectives will be considered through the rubric of New 
Zealand’s contemporary approaches to security.    
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION  
  
In his presentation of the 2010 Kippenberger Lecture, before an assembly 
of New Zealand’s Political, Defence and Foreign Affairs communities, noted 
scholar Muthia Alagappa was pointed in his assessment that the “world” 
confronting New Zealand is transforming. In reinforcing this point, Alagappa 
highlighted that this world is one increasingly characterised by and existence of 
“complex interdependence rather than the simple zero-sum geopolitical model 
suited to the Cold War era … [wherein] … the challenge today is to manage 
and reap the benefits of complexity, not to present simple choices that may be 
attractive but not grounded in reality.”1 Under the dynamics of such change, 
New Zealand – as another Kippenberger Chair, Geoffrey Till, colourfully 
explained – is not immune to the forces shaping today’s security environment. 
In this era, “New Zealand’s choice of national bird – the Kiwi – a charming 
creature that was quite defenceless since it was completely without a natural 
predator … became utterly vulnerable when conditions changed.”2 Till’s moral 
is that for New Zealand to maintain its sense of ‘security’, the nation must 
continually adapt to its ever changing security environment and circumstances. 
Adaptation, I will argue, will correspondingly require New Zealand to 
critically re-evaluate the theoretical and programmatic bases framing its 
security, and that for any formulated approach to security to be effective, this 
must be set in relief to the context and dynamics of the ‘globalisation of 
security’ and ‘bifurcated security environment.’   
 
To this end, Philip Zelikow has highlighted that all “security strategies 
start with a mental image of the world:”3 the external strategic environment, 
and the broad issues that will shape the character of security in global, 
                                                 
1 M. Alagappa, ‘A changing Asia-Pacific: Prospects for war, peace, cooperation and order’, 
Kippenberger Lecture, Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand, Wellington, 2010, p.12. 
2 G. Till, ‘Home and away: Defence priorities in a globalised world’, Kippenberger Lecture, 
Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand, Wellington, 2008, p. 7.  
3 P. Zelikow, ‘The Transformation of National Security’, in The National Interest, 2003, p.17. 
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international, state and individual ‘Human’ contexts.4 Such an approach must 
necessarily serve as the starting point for any reformulation of New Zealand’s 
conception of, and approach to security; and for my critical analysis of its 
security issues and requirements. In doing so, I will demonstrate that New 
Zealand’s appreciation of security is – at best – incomplete. Of greater concern 
however, my analysis will serve to highlight that the nation’s security 
considerations – at institutional levels – remain almost exclusively impelled by 
and towards traditional approaches to security, with their explicit emphases on 
geo-strategic imperatives and role of the state as the source, focus and arbiter of 
security. My analysis of New Zealand’s Defence White Paper 2010, will serve as 
the lens through which this issue is viewed.  
 
In comprehending the nature of today’s security challenges, one must first 
understand the concept of security by situating ‘it’ within the environmental 
contexts, characteristics and dynamics that shape and frame its conception. 
While the security focus and role of states has not been eclipsed, security and 
insecurity in the 21st Century is evolving from established patterns and trends 
previously framed narrowly and almost exclusively around traditional state-
centric and international calculations of power, and the notions of survival, 
sovereignty, threat and conflict. In this respect, I will assert that contemporary 
security discourses and programs should “reflect the consequences of a 
globalised security environment that has bifurcated between an older state-
centric world … and new [multi-centric] trans-state and sub-state strata.”5 In 
such an age there is an urgent need to reconsider and redress the security 
dimension and its traditional, prevailing imperatives.6 In responding 
comprehensively to the security challenges globalisation and bifurcation 
present, I will develop the contention that New Zealand needs renewal in its 
                                                 
4 see Z. Alach, ‘New Zealand’s Future Defence Force: Change or Stagnation?’, in Security 
Challenges, Vol 2(3), 2006, p. 63.   
5 M. Evans, ‘Contemporary Military Operations’ in R. Ayson and D. Ball (eds), Strategy and 
Security in the Asia-Pacific, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2005, p.53.  
6 see C. Coker, ‘Globalisation and Insecurity in the Twenty-first Century: NATO and the 
Management of Risk’, Adelphi PaperNo345, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2002, p. 91. 
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thinking and approaches to security, and that such renewal must critically 
challenge many of the preconceptions about what security ‘means’ for both 
states and citizens/individuals within contemporary settings. 
 
While renewal is necessary, in many respects, theoretical and conceptual, 
policy and practical evolutions in the field and pursuit of ‘security’ remains 
constrained by seemingly exclusivist and reductionist derived definitions and 
approaches to security. Such constraints are often a legacy of strategic thinking 
from bygone era, and  due in part to the still prevailing meaning conferred 
upon ‘security’ that has emerged from historically and politically prior 
accounts of ‘what’ and/or ‘who’ is being secured. In this sense, critics contest 
that the prevailing meaning of, and approaches to security are static and 
singularly limited in understanding, explaining, and responding, to the 
security’s contemporary contexts and settings. Such approaches continue to 
focus upon a reality characterised by the sovereign pre-eminence of states in an 
international system; by binary, status-quo orientations; and by an emphasis on 
material power, military threats and the need for strong counters to ensure 
state survival. However, under conditions of globalisation and bifurcation, 
traditional state-centric definitions and approaches to Security form only a 
single dimension of today’s security equation. In this respect, I will contend 
that, within contemporary settings, security must be considered as a complex, 
multi-dimensional, and continuously adaptive conception. For contemporary 
security approaches to establish and maintain enduring relevance and 
effectiveness, we must move beyond traditional orthodoxies to address the 
legitimate universal challenges or the concerns of ordinary people who have 
rightly sought security in their daily lives. 
 
Seeking to more precisely understand – and respond – to the complex 
dynamics and challenges inherently shaping security today, will require the 
establishment of more critically constructive, open and inclusive approaches to 
such. I will contend that the provision of sustainable security require 
perspectives that critically challenge, build upon, and go beyond the prevailing 
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traditional discourses of security. Critical interpretations of security provide us 
with more ontologically reflective and progressive bases for such action by 
challenging us to move beyond the idea of a single, integrated and unchanging 
subject of security.7 Within the network of critical approaches, I will offer that 
‘Human Security’ may provide us with the most effective means by which to 
realise a more ‘focussed, broader, deeper’ transformation of security – in 
theoretical, conceptual, policy and practical terms. 
 
Responding effectively to today’s security challenges will require the 
development of an already evolving ‘dialectic’ between state-centric and 
human-centric securities in ways that are mutually constitutive and reinforcing. 
Specifically, I will examine the value of Human Security as a ‘bridging’ and 
‘boundary’ concept in respect to its scope for normative influence on state-
centric security agendas and practice. Through my analysis of New Zealand’s 
current approach to security and defence, and my consideration of the evolving 
dialectic, I will establish what I believe to be the necessary bases from which 
New Zealand should consider its security within contemporary settings. 
 
In this sense, addressing the limitations of prevailing statist security 
approaches will require the adoption of a comprehensive concept of security. 
Importantly, such a notion must be inclusive, and recognise that the security of 
the state and international system is coterminous with that of the individual 
and universal Humanity.  To this end, I will demonstrate that a modern 
comprehensive approach, that integrates all sectors of an ever-evolving security 
community, will be fundamental to addressing both contemporary and future 
security challenges. Indeed, transforming and building frameworks and 
institutions that provide universal security and justice is considered essential to 
breaking cycles of state and human insecurity, and to restoring and sustaining 
the confidence of populations.8 Crucially, development in this direction is 
already underway. Indeed, within New Zealand the utility of a comprehensive 
                                                 
7 see K. Booth, Theory of World Security, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2007, p.282. 
8 see World Bank, Human Development Report 2011, Washington DC, 2011, p. xi.   
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approach has framed the National Security System concept, and is being 
intrinsically linked to the need to include critical perspectives, and provide a 
corresponding focus on the ‘human dimension’ within national security 
considerations.9  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 see American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand (ABCA) Armies’ Program, 
‘Strategic Assessment of the Security Environment 2012 – 2035’, ABCA Report No 154, 
Washington DC, 6 February, 2012, pp. i-ii.  
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CHAPTER 1: TRANSFORMING SECURITY: THE ‘GLOBALISATION OF 
SECURITY’ AND THE BIFURCATION OF THE CONTEMPORARY 
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT  
 
Introduction 
Fundamentally, ‘security’ exists as a complex and adaptive social 
phenomenon. It is accepted as a core organising principle within societies and 
states, with efforts to preserve ‘security’ central to the human condition.10 
Certainly, “few people would deny that security, whether individual, national 
or international, ranks prominently among the problems facing humanity.”11 
Yet critically, as Buzan underlines, in much of its prevailing use, the concept of 
security, in contemporary settings, is so weakly developed as to be inadequate 
for the task.12 Indeed, Buzan refines this contention by suggesting that the core 
weakness stems from his belief “that traditional conceptions of security were 
(and in many minds still are) too narrowly focussed. That advance does not, 
however, mean that a consensus exists on what a more broadly constructed 
conception should look like.”13  
 
While there remains a conspicuous theoretical and practical focus upon 
the security of states and the international system, increasingly, security 
scholars and practitioners alike are speaking to the emergence of an evolution in 
21st Century notions of ‘security’ and ‘insecurity’. In this sense, we are 
beginning to explore beyond traditionally narrow and established security 
dogma, and doctrines framed almost exclusively around state-centric and 
international systemic calculations. Rather, this is an evolution founded upon 
an emerging consensus amongst security scholarship and bureaucracies that 
the contemporary security environment is presenting as an increasingly 
complex set of challenges and opportunities to states, the international system, 
                                                 
10 see S. Dalby, Geopolitical Change and Contemporary Security Studies, University of British 
Columbia, 2000, p.19; and B. Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for Security Studies in the 
post Cold War Era, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hertfordshire, 1991, p.3. 
11 B. Buzan, ibid, p.1. 
12 see ibid. 
13 see ibid., p.14. 
 9
and global Humanity alike.14  In comprehending the nature of today’s security 
challenges therefore, we are required to first seek a clearer understanding of 
the concept of security by situating ‘it’ within the prevailing ‘environmental’ 
contexts, characteristics and dynamics that shape and frame its conception. 
 
In addressing this need, Evans’ contends, today’s challenges are 
pervasively complex and volatile in character. They are both representative and 
a consequence of a “new multi-centric [‘globalised’] environment [that] has not 
abolished the traditional state-centric world order; but rather … superimposed 
itself upon that order creating a bifurcated or two-tier strategic environment.”15 
Under such conditions, and within an increasingly two-track strategic world, 
the resilience and utility of prevailing security ideas, institutions and practices 
cannot be assumed. Indeed, as New Zealand’s most recent Defence Assessment 
and Defence White Paper 2010 attest, the underlying stability and predictability 
which characterised international relations and security throughout the latter 
period of the 20th Century is now being tested, the rules-based international 
order is under pressure, and states are confronting an increasingly uncertain 
and more challenging strategic outlook.16    
 
In the 21st Century, insecurity is intensifying on a global scale. It is 
becoming one of the primary development challenges of our time, wherein 
one-and-a-half billion people continue to live in areas affected by fragility, and 
persistent competition, conflict and violence.17 The adverse impacts of 
globalisation are transforming the security environment and agenda 
                                                 
14 For examples see United States Department of Defense (USDOD), Sustaining U.S. Global 
Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, Washington DC, January 2012, p. 1; Futures 
Support Group, Strategic Assessment of the Security Environment 2008-2030, ABCA Armies 
Standardisation Program, Washington DC, 2008, pp. 3-16; and New Zealand Defence Force 
(NZDF), Future Joint Operating Concept (FJOC), New Zealand Government, Wellington, 2012, p. 
iii.   
15M. Evans, ‘Towards an Australian National Security Strategy: A Conceptual Analysis,’ in 
Security Challenges, Vol 3(4), 2007, p. 117; and see Evans in Ayson and Ball (eds), op.cit., p. 53; 
and B. Jenkins, ‘Redefining the Enemy’, in RAND Review, Vol 28(1), 2004, p.17. 
16 see New Zealand Ministry of Defence (NZMOD), Defence White Paper 2010, New Zealand 
Government, 2010, pp. 10, 23-4, 27-8.    
17 see World Bank, op.cit., p.1.   
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profoundly;18 and increasingly, traditional security ideas and approaches are 
losing much of their relevance and resonance. Crucially, they are proving ill-
suited or inadequate to understanding, explaining, and coping with the 
security challenges of today, even when national or international interests or 
values have prompted action. Consequently, this will “require a substantially 
new manner of thinking if mankind is to survive.”19 In this respect, I will assert 
that contemporary security discourses and programs should “reflect the 
consequences of a globalised security environment that has bifurcated between 
an older state-centric world … and new [multi-centric] trans-state and sub-state 
strata.”20  Indeed today’s “world is a crucible of challenges … Global problems 
… demanding comprehensive solutions.”21 In such an age there is an urgent 
need to reconsider and redress the security dimension and its traditional, 
prevailing imperatives. In responding comprehensively and effectively, I will 
develop the contention that New Zealand needs renewal in its thinking and 
approaches to security, and that such renewal must critically challenge many of 
the preconceptions about what security ‘means’ for both states and 
citizens/individuals under contemporary conditions.  
 
As Coker reflects, the spirit of our time – the Zeitgeist – is pointing us 
towards an ‘age of globalisation.’22 The extent to which globalisation continues 
to underwrite the future order, and impacts on global and local affairs, is 
central to framing the contemporary security context. Addressing this 
transformational impact on security is to recognise that transnational and 
localised phenomena are likely to become the more prominent causes of risk, 
threat and insecurity, and that change – and its inherent challenges – has 
become the constant. Its pressures have been internalised and intensified 
                                                 
18 see HE C. Bisogniero, ‘NATO in a globalised world’, in NZ International Review, 2011, p. 10.  
19 see World Bank, op. cit., p. xi; and United Nations ‘Human Development Report 1994’, New 
York, p.22.  
20 Evans in Ayson and Ball (eds), op.cit., p.53.  
21 H.R. Clinton, ‘Leading through Civilian Power: redefining American Diplomacy and 
Development’, in Foreign Affairs, Vol 89(6), 2010, p.13; for the impact of Globalisation on 
contemporary security see also: D. Richards, Chief of the Defence Staff Address to Chatham House, 
London, 2008, p. 2.  
22 see Coker, op.cit, p. 91. 
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within every society trying to adapt to the quickening pace of this change.23 In 
this respect, in the era of globalisation, people’s participation is increasingly 
becoming the central issue of our time. “People today have an urge – an 
impatient urge – to participate in processes that shape their lives. And that 
impatience brings many dangers and opportunities.”24 Dangers occur when the 
complex and networked dynamism of human participation clashes with the 
hierarchical and linear inflexibility of state and international systems and 
regimes. In addressing this danger, globalisation has presented Humanity with 
the opportunity to fundamentally challenge and seek renewal within existing 
state-centric security paradigms.  
 
The new security environment and transforming security agenda have 
provoked important public debate about security, and as Burke suggests, has 
contributed to some intriguing intellectual developments in mainstream 
(liberal and realist) security approaches. Yet these approaches continue to 
constrain the debate within existing assumptions, and fail to pursue more 
critical perspectives and questions about how we conceptualise security.25 To 
this end, for contemporary security discourses, policies and programs to 
establish and maintain enduring relevance and effectiveness, I call for an end to 
the narrow and binary framing of security under predominantly state-centric 
and geo-strategic imperatives. I will show that many of the emerging 
challenges to security are the “result of forces outside the traditional 
framework of strategic analysis that have little to do with the exercise of power 
by competing nation-states, but everything to do with the stability of states and 
human survival.”26 In this sense, the implications for individuals and all states, 
including New Zealand, are profound. The security issues now shaping our 
world, both individually and systemically, are ‘environmental’ in nature and 
                                                 
23 see A. Dupont, ‘Transnational Security’ in Ayson and Ball (eds), op.cit., p.103; and P. Zelikow, 
op.cit., p.18.  
24 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), Human 
Development Report (HDR93), 1993, P.1. 
25 see A. Burke, ‘Critical approaches to security and strategy’ in Ayson and Ball (eds), op.cit., p. 
155.  
26 Dupont in Ayson and Ball (eds), op.cit., p.103. 
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increasingly universal in character. Appreciating the transformative dynamics 
of these environmental contexts forms the necessary basis for the re-
conceptualisation of contemporary security.  In understanding these contexts, 
we stand better prepared to positively influence and respond comprehensively 
– in theoretical, policy and practical terms – to the security challenges these 
pervasive environments present. Respectively, this element of my Thesis 
establishes that the contemporary security environment, characterised by the 
‘globalisation of security’ and the ‘bifurcation of the security environment’, 
should serve as the contextual catalyst for change and the compass for 
evolution in our appreciations of security. 
 
The Globalisation of Security and the Bifurcated Security Environment 
There is an increasing consensus that the key strategic trend shaping the 
millennium is a ‘globalisation of security’, which is conveying major structural 
changes in theoretical, programmatic and practical agency through its creation 
of a ‘bifurcated security environment.’27 In this context, globalisation is perhaps 
best understood as the correlative processes of interdependence between the 
‘global’ and ‘local’ that are transforming the security  environment, but without 
eradicating traditional, coercive and exclusionary state-centrism.28 
Synonymously, bifurcation is representative of what Rosenau defines as the 
two worlds of ‘world politics’ – the symmetric, state-centric world and the 
asymmetric, multi-centric and networked world – that are increasingly 
interacting so creating volatile and unpredictable patterns of risk, threat and 
conflict.29 In this sense, most challenges are no longer direct but indirect. They 
are not specifically geo-strategic but are projected through territory into 
                                                 
27 For comprehensive discussion on the ‘globalisation of security’ and the ‘bifurcated security 
environment’ see: C. Browning, ‘The Globalisation of Security’, in Chatham House Briefing Paper 
05/02, London, 2005; J. Steinbrunner, Principles of Global Security, Brookings Institution, 
Washington DC, p. 96;  Coker, op.cit., pp. 20-21;  and K. Gustafson, ‘Complex Threats: The 
Globalisation of Domestic and Foreign Security’, in RUSI Journal, Vol 155(1), 2010, pp. 72-8. 
28 see M. Evans, ‘The Twenty-First Century Security Environment’, in The RUSI Journal, Vol 
154(2), 2009, p. 64; and A. Burke, What security makes possible: Some thoughts on critical security 
studies, Department of International Relations Working Paper 2007/1, Australian National 
University, 2007, p.3. 
29see J. Rosenau, Turbulence in world politics: a theory of change and continuity, Princeton 
University Press, 1990, pp.249-271.   
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permeable open societies. Globalisation has created a new supraterritorial 
space alongside, and interrelated with, older territorial, power political 
determinants. 30  
 
The ‘environmental’ factors stimulating the globalisation and bifurcation 
of security are characterised by the impulses of complexity and adaptiveness, 
and circulation and interdependence.31 In appreciating how these factors 
operate, it is useful to recall Rosenau’s notion of ‘fragmeration’, in which 
fragmentation and integration are simultaneous and often intersecting events.  
We are experiencing the convergence of the manifold forces of ‘localisation’ 
and ‘globalisation’ and ‘decentralisation’ and ‘centralisation’, where these 
forces collide and can bring about profound and often violent consequences.  
Their dynamics are circular rather than linear, and their effects cannot be 
wholly evaluated through traditional security – trend focussed – lenses. They 
present as novel problems of analysis and response, and unless security theory, 
policy and practice incorporate a more comprehensive understanding of the 
contemporary system, we will continue to be incapable of fully comprehending 
and addressing many of the potential challenges the globalisation of security 
presents.32  
 
If properly nurtured, these environmental factors can also serve as sources 
of tremendous vitality and innovation for the creation of new and more just 
societies. This will require integrated comprehensive programs to counter the 
array challenges and threats now facing Humanity. These responses must be 
inclusive in nature and accommodating of alternative, non-traditional security 
approaches and perspectives. Importantly, these responses require a  critical 
shift beyond prevailing conceptualisations of order that remain centred on 
                                                 
30 see M. Evans, ‘Overcoming the Creswell-Foster Divide in Australian Strategy’, in Australian 
Journal of International Affairs, vol 61(2), 2007, p.196.  
31 For examples see A. Grisogono and A. Ryan, Insights for Counterinsurgency Operations from 
Complex Adaptive Systems Thinking, Defence Science and Technology Organisation, Canberra.     
32 see P. Liotta, ‘Boomerang Effect: The Convergence of National and Human Security’, in 
Security Dialogue, Vol 33(4), 2002, p. 485;  Dupont in Ayson and Ball (eds), op.cit., p.111; and M. 
Beeson and A. Bellamy, Globalisation, Security and International Order after September 11, 
University of Queensland, 2009, p. 3. 
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sovereign entities and binary distinctions between ‘self and other.’ The 
globalisation of security has demonstrated that unless the integration of 
marginalised elements occurs on a more equitable basis, and unless the same 
logic of co-dependence can be extended to the construction of new regimes of 
security – which recognise that security is mutually constitutive and 
interdependent – then security is unlikely to prove sustainable. Consequently, 
framing responses that will ensure the corresponding survival of the state and 
the emancipation of humankind require that many traditional security concepts 
and institutions be radically revised and renewed, or new ones created.33      
 
Circulation and Interdependency  
A fundamental impact of the globalisation and bifurcation of security has 
been its cumulative effect in opening space in academic, policy and practical 
domains for new thinking about security and insecurity. In particular, as 
Newman highlights, this has resulted in critical challenges to the security 
orthodoxy that appear to neglect the real threats to humankind. The post-Cold 
War and post-‘9/11’ world has encouraged rigorous questioning about the 
ways of explaining and understanding conceptions of security, and the policies 
and institutions designed to address insecurity. 34  
 
In this conceptual sense, globalisation translates as a fundamentally 
human endeavour which is redefining notions of community, power and 
security, and socio-political interdependency on simultaneous local and 
universal scales.35 Globalisation increasingly personifies a priority focus on 
individuals, social communities and populations in preference to states, the 
international system, and institutions; and it features an evolving reliance upon 
cellular and networked interactive communities and a diffusion of power and 
security. As such, power and security must now be considered 
heterogeneously and plurally, where ‘it’ flows in all directions and whole 
                                                 
33 see Beeson and Bellamy, op.cit., pp.26-29; and HDR93, op.cit., p. 1. 
34 see E. Newman, Human Security, University of Birmingham, 2009, p. 5. 
35 see M. DeLarringa and M. Doucet, ‘Sovereign Power and the Biopolitics of Human Security’, 
in Security Dialogue, vol 39(5), 2008. 
 15
populations participate in wielding it; where it is exercised over individuals 
rather than being legitimised at the centre; and where it is recognised as 
circulating through networks rather than necessarily being applied at particular 
traditional systemic points.36  
 
Critically and cognitively, ‘circulation’ abstractly “translates the new 
global security problematic from a ‘geo-strategic’ into an ecological [Human-
centred] problem characterised by the escalatory dynamics of complex 
interdependencies.”37 The coalescence of circulation and interdependence 
therefore, possesses a particular resonance when considered in the context of 
the globalisation of security. Indeed, the globalisation of security emphasises 
the seamless web of social (cosmopolitan) interdependencies and flows – and the 
risks, threats and opportunities they simultaneously present. This new 
environment necessarily challenges and critically problematises power-based 
models of international politics that privilege “high politics” above all else. This 
challenge is both empirical and normative, and emphasises the increasing 
utility of a range of non-traditional security approaches which expose the 
‘illegitimacy’ of orthodox approaches.38 Here, as Booth presciently highlighted, 
daily threats to the lives and wellbeing of individuals and the interests of most 
states are not primarily derived from “a neighbour’s army but from other 
challenges, such as economic collapse, political oppression, scarcity, 
overpopulation, ethnic rivalry, the destruction of nature, terrorism, crime and 
disease.”39 While these broader security problems are not as “cosmically 
threatening” as the array of more traditional threats, they do present as 
problems of profound significance that if left unmitigated could have grave 
consequences for Humanity.40  Consequently, this creates an increasingly 
crowded and complex security agenda, where different concerns compete for 
                                                 
36 see M. Foucault, The History of sexuality, Volume 1. An Introduction, Allen Lane, 1979(1), pp.92-
102; and M. Foucault, “Society Must be Defended” Lectures at the College De France, Allen Lane, 
2003, pp.27-33.   
37 Browning, op.cit., p.2.  
38 see Newman, op.cit, 2009, p. 3. 
39 K. Booth, ‘Security and emancipation’, in Review of International Studies, vol 17(4), 1991, p.318. 
40 see ibid. 
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local, global and state attention and resources. What distinguishes the new 
security problematic from traditional security thinking therefore is the 
preoccupation with complex and adaptive global/local circulations and 
interdependencies.  
 
Complexity and ‘Adaptivity’ 
 If circulation and interdependence frame the general challenges and 
problems inherent in the globalisation of security, then “complexity poses its 
epistemic challenge. How are we to understand how these complex systems of 
global circulation [and interdependence] operate and how to manage them in 
ways that will avoid the potential for disaster stored up within them?”41 Under 
the dynamics of the globalisation and bifurcation of security, both traditional 
and non-traditional security communities and elites are now necessarily 
concerned with the circulation of ‘everything.’ In this sense, it is becoming 
increasingly recognised and acknowledged that the “very smallest 
perturbations or anomalies in one system of circulation can have the potential 
to cascade rapidly into large-scale crises affecting many other local and global 
systems of circulation.”42 Correspondingly, in security policy and 
programmatic senses, this complexity has exacerbated the problem wherein 
multiple objectives are competing for resources, and the pursuit of one 
objective can affect others in ways that are extremely difficult or impossible to 
predict.43   
 
 We must acknowledge that globalisation, circulation and interdependency 
are inherently human and social actions that expand the scope and opportunity 
for human development and global evolution. But we must also recognise that 
these actions possess the simultaneous power to exacerbate human insecurity, 
and societal and state vulnerability. This requires us to remain cognisant of the 
compounding “global social” challenge posed to prevailing notions and 
                                                 
41 see Browning, op.cit., p. 2.   
42 ibid. 
43 see D. Walker, ‘Refining the Military Appreciation Process for Adaptive Campaigning’, in 
Australian Army Journal, Vol 8(2), 2011, P.93.  
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modalities of security.44 We must also recognise the limitations of prevailing 
traditional state security and military agendas framed by predictive and rational 
empiricism. This ‘compound’ is aggravated by the complex and exponentially 
adaptive nature of these circulations which manifests in inherently human and 
social forms. Complexity in this instance is characterised by many agents or 
elements interacting in many different and nonlinear ways that give rise to vast 
arrays of possible patterns of behaviour. Crucially, complexity means that 
knowing all the components of a network (society), and how they interact with 
each other – which is in itself an impossibility – does not mean that you can 
predict how the entire system will behave as a whole.  Consequently, simple 
systems of binary cause and effect, (for example: ‘zero sum’ victory/defeat 
equations), that are often representative of narrow traditional approaches to 
security, cannot accurately or effectively model the networked causality of the 
process.45  
 
By extension, a defining characteristic of “all complex adaptive systems is 
their capacity to change composition and/or behaviour in order to improve 
their fitness for the environments they occupy.”46 Recognising that groups, 
communities and societies are able to exploit the power of adaptation to 
display resilience and robustness, agility and responsiveness, and flexibility 
and innovation in the face of complex challenges47 is critical to the formulation 
of effective and comprehensive security strategies required in the age of 
globalisation.  
 
The adaptive complexity of contemporary security has arguably reached 
levels that challenge human comprehension; and its conditions – wherein 
challenges and opportunities are transnational and seamless, unpredictable, 
and in rapid flux – have the potential to pose the most serious security concerns 
                                                 
44 see Deuchars, op.cit.   
45 see Deuchars op.cit; Grisogono and Ryan, op.cit., p.1; and NZDF, op.cit., p. 38. 
46 M. Ryan, ‘Measuring Success and Failure in an Adaptive Army’, in Australian Army Journal, 
vol6(3), 2009, p.22.  
47 see Australian Army, Adaptive Campaigning: Future Land Operating Concept, Department of 
Defence, Canberra, 2009, p.17.  
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of this millennium. Indeed, such is the significance of these emerging ‘new’ 
non-traditional issues that they are steadily moving from the periphery to the 
centre of the security equation for individuals, states and Humanity alike.48 
Collectively, they represent the new security agenda49 that will increasingly 
demand security studies, programmes and practices reconcile with broader, 
deeper and more complex understandings derived from contemporary 
environmental contexts. In this respect, security, especially in its modern and 
globalised manifestations has become a highly complex theoretical and public 
policy challenge.50 Correspondingly, this reinforces the imperative to adopt 
more comprehensive security approaches that are increasingly framed by 
critical perspectives, and which are cognisant of the intrinsic role of individuals 
in global circulations and complex adaptive ‘systems.’  
 
From Territoriality to ‘Local-Global’ connectedness 
One central phenomenon of the globalisation of security has been a shift 
from a state of arbitrary territoriality and sovereignty to a diffuse environment 
progressively characterised by connectedness and interdependency. In this 
change, as former United Kingdom Defence Secretary John Reid reflects, we 
have transitioned from  
 
“a relatively static world of inviolable national borders, iron curtains and concrete 
walls that prohibited and limited movement and controlled transport and 
communications networks, we now live with mass mobility of people and the knowledge 
                                                 
48 see Dupont in Ayson and Ball (eds), op.cit., p.103. 
49 Such is the complex character of contemporary security, it is not my intent to attempt to 
subjectively emphasise particular security issues within the agenda, other than to highlight that 
we have moved beyond exclusively geo-strategic considerations to include a broad array of 
challenges. This said, for examples of the breadth and types of both traditional, and ‘non-
traditional’ and/or new security issues/dimensions being considered see: G. Evans, ‘The New 
Global Security Agenda’ in D. McDougall and P. Shearman (eds), Australian Security After 9/11: 
New and Old Agendas, Ashgate Publishing, 2006, p. 4; NZDF, op.cit., pp.1-9 & 23-5; ABCA, op.cit., 
2011, pp. 4-19; NZMOD, op. cit., pp.15-34; and UK Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, Strategic 
Trends, Ministry of Defence, Wilton, 2003.       
50 see A. Rathmell, ‘Adapting Governments for Stabilisation and Counterinsurgency 
Operations’, in The RUSI Journal, vol 154(6), 2009, p.9.    
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that they produce and use in an unprecedented and growing scale. The consequences of 
this great change are both global and local.”51  
 
In a positive sense, today’s security dynamics are opening new space and 
providing evermore opportunities for the establishment of ‘emancipatory’ and 
inclusive social and processes where the constraints of geography on political, 
social and cultural arrangements are receding, and people and communities are 
become increasingly aware that these constraints are receding.52  
 
The effect of such change has resulted in a worldwide intensification of 
social relations – particularly at individual and sub-state community levels – 
where events in one place are shaping, and being shaped by, incidents 
occurring in very distant locations.53 As most recently witnessed in the ‘Arab 
spring’ of 2011, the globalisation and bifurcation of security is directly 
confronting individuals, communities and states alike with local-global forces, 
while enhanced networks are provoking a stronger awareness of, and 
sensitivity to remote events. In this sense, we can no longer ignore what 
happens in distant places and retreat behind moral and physical borders.54 
Consequently, the processes of globalisation and bifurcation are “interacting 
and changing the context of the lives of people as individuals and groups.”55 
They are blurring the distinctions between the local and global, and are 
precipitating an increasing awareness of ‘non-territoriality,’ wherein territory 
and political sovereignty are losing their resonance as central organising tenets 
for action and interaction, and politics and security. Correspondingly 
globalisation and bifurcation are also weakening existing political and security 
institutions, such as states, while strengthening the global and international 
                                                 
51 J. Reid, ‘Securing Critical National Infrastructure’, in RUSI Journal, vol 152(3), 2007, p.15.  
52 see M. Waters, Globalisation, Routledge, London, 1995, p. 3.  
53 see A. Giddens, Jenseits von Links und Rechts, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, 1997, p. 85.  
54 see L. Goetschel, ‘Globalisation and Security: The Challenge of Collective Action in a 
Politically Fragmented World’, in Global Society, Vol 14(2), 2000, pp. 260 and 272. 
55 Booth, op.cit., p.314. 
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influence of other actors such as supranational and transnational organisations 
and individuals.56  
 
Resultantly, the ‘local-global’ can no longer be considered “mutually 
exclusive; it is part of the development of more complex and overlapping 
identities which will characterise the future.”57 The effect of this development 
has been the compelling need for the adaptation of security approaches to the 
changing social, structural and environmental conditions highlighted here. 
Indeed, in the era of the ‘global social’ – when borders are becoming 
particularly permeable and notions of discrete sovereignty less sustainable –  
transformation is essential because traditional security practices are proving 
limited in comprehending or providing strategies for dealing with the types of 
problems encountered in a world of complex networks and ‘transversal 
relationships.’58  
 
The ‘Riskscape’ 
 A second prominent feature of globalised security reshaping the ways in 
which we think about security, has been the amplification of the global 
‘riskscape’ and rise of strategic risk analysis. In this millennium, equations of 
risk are occupying a commensurate standing with the more traditional 
calculations of security analysis (such as notions of threat). This is derived from 
an explicit recognition that the global era has created “a world in which risk is 
endless.”59 It is becoming commonplace to think we are subject to risks that are 
potentially more catastrophic because they are global; for as Gellner explains, 
risk has become central to our security thinking and behaviour as globalisation 
                                                 
56 see D. Elkins, Beyond Sovereignty. Territory and Political Economy in the Twenty-First Century, 
University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1995, p. 87; and J. Rosenau, ‘Governance and Democracy 
in a Globalising World’, in D. Archibugi, D. Held and M. Kohler (eds) Re-imagining Political 
Community. Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1998, p. 40.  
57 Booth, op.cit., p.315. 
58 see R. Bleiker, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press, 
2000, p. 2.  
59 W.J. (Bill) Clinton, quoted in The New York Times, December 1998. 
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draws us out of our self-contained national and local communities into a 
broader environment that offers none of the traditional protections.60  
 
The imperatives ‘governing’ the globalisation and bifurcation of security 
now requires the co-consideration of traditional, power-based geo-strategic and 
military threats that were at once quantifiable, measurable and tangible, and the 
emerging web of ‘unpredictable, immeasurable and intangible’ security risks – 
or “vectors of harm”61 –  that are empowered by the dynamics of complexity, 
circulations, and local-global interconnectedness.62 This environment is 
advancing the emergence of an evolving ‘riskscape’, and the rise of a “new risk 
rationality of strategy”63 in which security threats and risks are identified on a 
comprehensive ‘all-hazards’ basis. In many respects, the rise of the ‘riskscape’ 
phenomenon is symbolic of broader, deeper and more fundamental structural 
and social changes occurring within global, international and local 
communities. This means that all complex and adaptive risks to security 
whether internal or external, human or natural, must be considered 
referentially as ‘risks in common.’64 In effect therefore, the notion of the 
‘riskscape’ seeks to identify and address complex, interdependent security 
challenges that have the capacity to adversely escalate or cascade between 
individual and community, and state and international levels respectively.65  
So when we conceptualise security we increasingly do so in terms of risk, and 
risk is determining the discourse of contemporary security.66 Correspondingly, 
understanding the potential impacts and consequences of this ‘riskscape’ 
requires us to critically challenge prevailing and increasingly inadequate state-
centric discourses, and necessarily seeking broader, deeper and more 
comprehensive and inclusive solutions to complex challenges. 
                                                 
60 see E. Gellner, in M. Douglas (ed) Risk and Blame: Essays in Cultural Theory, Routledge, 
London, 1992, p.13.  
61 NZDPMC, op.cit, p.21. 
62 see M. Rasmussen, The Risk Society at War: Terror, Technology and Strategy in the Twenty-First 
Century, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006. 
63 NZDPMC, ibid., p.2. 
64 see NZDPMC, op.cit., p.5.   
65 see NZDPMC op.cit., p.9. 
66 see Coker, op.cit., p.60.  
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Conclusions 
 In a world being shaped by the dynamics and imperatives of the 
globalisation and bifurcation of security, ‘challenges’ (risks, threats and 
vulnerability) are seamlessly interrelated. A challenge to one is a challenge to 
all, and vulnerability is a mutually-constitutive condition.67 This plight flows 
from the new reality of circulation that “ties local life to global structures, 
processes and events,”68 and from the multi-centric manifestation of 
interactive, complex and adaptive networks. The transformative nature of 
globalisation and the volatility of its dangers is having a profound effect the 
comprehension of contemporary security; and is conspiring to heighten senses 
of uncertainty, insecurity and political and social anxiety in what Rosenau calls 
a turbulent world.69 In many respects, these tensions spring from an increasing 
recognition that prevailing “security [approaches] which assume a world of 
unchanging objective variables cannot recognise, let alone address the sorts of 
[challenges] that are emerging.”70   
 
Prevailing security discourses are very much ‘reductionist’ in that they 
reduce globalisation’s security dimension to threats posed exclusively to state 
security. Such a circumstance, as I will discuss, stems from a somewhat 
unreflective attitude in prevailing security scholarship and policy-making. In 
doing so, I will contend that traditional security approaches, and their basic 
assumptions do, not allow for a comprehensive conceptualisation of 
globalisation and bifurcation’s impacts on security; whereas critical and 
human-centric approaches and their deeper and broader concentration on 
change, norms, and values have the capacity to provide more relevant and 
                                                 
67 see Office of the Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility: Report of 
the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, United Nations, 2009, 
p.14. 
68 Coker, op.cit., p. 19. 
69 see J. Rosenau, Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997. 
70 M. Beeson and A. Bellamy, op.cit., pp.24 – 25. 
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meaningful theoretic bases for security analyses and programmatic 
development and practice.71  
 
I will argue that the core challenges to individual, state and broader 
systemic securities – and our responses to them – are dialectic, and must be 
considered analogously and in accord, rather than through inimical approaches 
and frames. By considering security comprehensively, and in the larger context 
of contemporary environmental change “allows one to better understand both 
the current state of the field and its place in the academy, and to make 
suggestions as to how practitioners might rethink … the policy advice they 
suggest to the powerful.”72 As follows, the necessary starting point for an 
analysis of New Zealand’s future security programmatic and structural 
requirements is the contemporary security environment shaped by the 
bifurcation and globalisation of security.73 In this respect, the transformative 
dynamics of the contemporary security environment are conspiring to generate 
new contexts by which states such as New Zealand must understand and 
respond to contemporary security imperatives. Accordingly, this will require a 
refocus of New Zealand’s “political logic of strategy, balancing a global-local 
nexus and blending the networked challenges of [bifurcated and] globalised 
security into a new policy calculus for the 21st century.”74  
 
 
 
                                                 
71 see Goetschel, op.cit., p. 277. 
72 Dalby, op.cit., pp. 2-3. 
73 see Alach, op.cit., p. 63.   
74 M. Evans, 2007, op.cit., p. 114.  
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Chapter 2: SECURITY DISCOURSES AND THE EVOLVING DIALECTIC  
 
Introduction 
 Whether considered on an individual basis, or focussed at community, 
state, international systemic or ‘global social’ levels, security is a legitimate 
quest for all.75 But what do we mean by ‘security’? In many respects, the 
answer is at once vague and equivocal – obscured by its inherently subjective 
nature as both a politically and socially derived conception. In this sense, the 
idea of security – like notions of power, justice, peace, equality, love and 
freedom – is an essentially contested concept; and such concepts “necessarily 
generate unsolvable debates about their meaning, because … they contain 
ideological elements which render empirical evidence irrelevant as a means of 
resolving dispute.”76  
 
Under globalised and bifurcated conditions that are diffuse and manifold 
in both cause and effect, the notion of ‘security’ defies the imposition of a 
singular, agreed and non-contested general definition. Under such 
circumstances however, one would consider that unique opportunities are 
present to develop a more normatively open, inclusive and universal 
understanding of, and approach to security. Doing so would ensure that we 
stand better prepared to respond comprehensively to the mosaic of traditional 
and emerging security challenges we now face. Indeed, as Indonesia’s Foreign 
Minister Natalegawa recently pronounced, under such transformative 
conditions “it is possible to accentuate the norms and procedures for common 
stability. It [can no longer] be security ‘against’.”77
 
In many respects however, the ‘security’ field remains constrained by 
seemingly exclusivist, reductionist and linearly derived definitions and 
approaches. Indeed, as Booth contends, prevailing security orthodoxies have 
“operated as such an iron cage in world politics; [they have] created a prison of 
                                                 
75 see Deuchars, op.cit., 2010.  
76 Buzan, op.cit., 1991, p. 7. 
77 M. Natalegawa, cited in P. Hartcher, ‘Indonesia urges calm over rise of China’, in The Sydney 
Morning Herald, 16 March 2012.  
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categories and assumptions that have worked to create a world that does not 
work for most of its inhabitants.”78 Christie expands on this theme arguing that 
“the nature of security discourse and practice itself is too sedimented, and that 
struggles over defining security, and setting security practice, occur within a 
system in which particular actors are able to dictate the terms of the debate.”79  
 
Such constraints are often symptomatic of legacy strategic thinking, and 
due in part to the still prevailing meaning conferred upon ‘security’ that has 
emerged from historically and politically prior accounts of ‘what’ and/or ‘who’ 
is being secured. In this sense, critics contest that prevailing, traditional 
approaches to security are too static and limited in understanding, explaining, 
and responding to today’s security challenges. This critique is based on an 
emerging belief that these security discourses, policies and practices are 
constrained by their “claim to have discerned laws of world politics which 
transcend time, and personality; [… in which states assume the central 
responsibility and authority for confronting] the immediacy and necessity of a 
‘real’ and threatening anarchical world marked by an endemic struggle for 
power and survival over others in an effort to maintain order and security.”80 
Such a point, and its universally negative impacts, are reinforced by Australian 
Foreign Minister Carr’s belief that when “we make the anarchical assumption, 
everyone will behave according to the worst-case scenario.”81
 
As will be considered, prevailing state approaches to security continue to 
focus on an almost singular, and hence, narrow image of ‘reality’ buttressed by 
rational, predefined national, and specifically, military strategic solutions to key 
global challenges.82 Such approaches continue to focus upon a reality 
characterised by the sovereign pre-eminence of states in an international 
                                                 
78 K. Booth, ‘Critical Explorations’, in K. Booth (ed), Critical Security Studies and World Politics, 
Lynne Rienner, Colorado, 2005, p.4. 
79 R. Christie, ‘Critical Voices and Human Security, in Security Challenges, Vol 41(2), 2010, p.184. 
80 W. Bain, ‘Deconfusing Morgenthau: moral inquiry and classical realism’, in Review of 
International Studies, Vol 26, 2000, p.448. 
81 R. Carr, cited in Hartcher, op.cit. 
82 see K. Booth, ‘Security and emancipation’, in Review of International Studies, Vol 17, 1991, 
p.318. 
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system; by binary, status-quo orientations; and by an emphasis on material 
power, military threats and the need for strong counters to ensure state 
survival. Consequently, states and their interests continue to assume 
prominence as the near exclusive referents of and for security. Such a central 
position has hitherto remained effectively unchallenged, particularly in policy 
and practical senses. Indeed, states continue to perpetuate this unrivalled status 
by conceptualising and framing security around the notion that “one of the 
most important responsibilities of any Government is to ensure the security 
and territorial integrity of the nation.”83    
 
Given the enduring existence of Rosenau’s “symmetric, state-centric 
world”84, and the array of strategic uncertainty and challenges these conditions 
present, traditional approaches to security and state-centric discourses do 
continue to maintain measures of relevance. However, as I will demonstrate, 
such orthodoxies – while necessary – are not a wholly complete, adequate or 
sufficient means by which to understand the security challenges now facing 
humankind. We must seek to move beyond an exclusively state-centric lexicon 
and all that such entails. As illustrated, under conditions of bifurcation and 
globalisation, traditional – state-centric – definitions and approaches to security 
form only a single dimension of today’s security equation. In this respect, I will 
contend that, within contemporary settings, security must be considered as a 
complex, multi-dimensional, and continuously adaptive conception.  
 
To this end, it is becoming increasingly apparent that some of the 
“conceptual certainties of earlier periods are simply incapable of providing 
either plausible explanations of how an increasingly interconnected, multi-
actor world works, or providing a basis for public [security] policy.”85 For 
contemporary security approaches to establish and maintain relevance and 
effectiveness, we must move beyond traditional orthodoxies that have for too 
long been interpreted narrowly: conceptions which have related more to the 
                                                 
83 NZDPMC, op.cit., p.3. 
84 Rosenau, op.cit, p.196. 
85 Beeson and Bellamy, op.cit., pp.1-2. 
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base survival of nation-states than to addressing legitimate universal 
challenges or the concerns of ordinary people who have rightly sought security 
in their daily lives (though, it must be said, the objective of state survival and 
the need to address universal and individual security issues are not always, or 
necessarily incompatible). Such a move requires us to recognise that ‘security’ 
is not exclusive, but rather, it should be considered and understood as a 
‘derivative’ concept. Essentially, this means that security’s agency as a concept 
is subject to the complex and ever-changing realities and assumptions of the 
different contexts (theoretical, political, social, physical, material, and so on) in 
which it is situated.  
  
  In these respects, the “profound changes in [today’s] strategic scene are 
prompting the re-examination of security concepts and policies adopted in the 
past. The prevailing strategic outlook offers a window of opportunity for the 
review and development of fresh approaches and concepts.”86 Consequently, 
in seeking to more precisely understand, and respond to the complex dynamics 
and challenges shaping security today, will require the establishment of more 
critically constructive, open and inclusive approaches to such. I will contend 
that the provision of sustainable security require approaches that critically 
challenge, build upon, and go beyond the prevailing traditional discourses of 
security. Critical interpretations of security have the capacity to provide us 
with more ontologically reflective and progressive bases for such action by 
challenging us to move beyond the idea single, integrated and unchanging 
subject of security.87  
 
The importance of such transformation cannot be understated. This is 
particularly so when measured against inflexibly limited – and limiting – 
security orthodoxies that perpetuate “high levels of insecurity in the world and 
the dire conditions in which many people live … because it leaves political, 
economic and social power where it is … [and constructs] a politics that fails to 
                                                 
86 Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, The Concepts of Comprehensive Security 
and Cooperative Security, 2010, p.1. 
87 see K. Booth, Theory of World Security, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, p.282. 
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provide security for the vast majority of people in the world.”88 As I will 
demonstrate, Critical approaches seek the transformation of security’s 
meaning, understanding and practice through processes of ‘focussing’, 
‘deepening’ and ‘broadening’, and by standing ‘outside’ and transcending 
prevailing ideologies, interests, structures, and systems. Such approaches 
contend that security is not a static, stable or objective condition, nor do they 
seek to apply their own objective, singular reality or truth. Rather critical 
approaches recognise that (in)security must be discursively deconstructed, 
analysed and understood in terms of its derivative origins, and through each of 
its relative, complex and adaptive contexts and subjective variables. In doing 
so, Critical approaches seek the subsequent ‘reconstruction’ of security in a 
manner that more legitimately reflects and effectively responds to the realities 
of globalisation and bifurcation. They do so with a view that develops more 
promising ideas by which to overcome structural and contingent insecurities at 
all levels and in most – if not all – circumstances.89
  
Within the network of Critical approaches, I will offer that the notion of 
Human Security may provide us with the most effective means by which to 
realise a focussed, deeper, and broader transformation of security – in 
theoretical, conceptual, policy and practical terms. In this sense, a defining 
characteristic of human security is its scope for, and engagement with policy, 
and its desire to transform traditional security policies in normatively 
progressive, open and inclusive ways. A principal objective of Human Security 
is to encourage security providers, and specifically the state, to invest the 
attention and resources required to address not only traditional, but also 
today’s complex, ‘non-traditional’ security challenges. Indeed, one of the core 
strengths of human security is that it “enhances state security by invigorating 
and creating a more holistic understanding of security … that accommodates 
                                                 
88 see Booth in Booth (ed), op.cit, 2005, p.7. 
89 see Booth in Booth (ed), op.cit, 2005, p.7. 
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the vulnerabilities of both the individual and the state.”90 Of fundamental 
importance to this Thesis however, is an understanding that what follows does 
not attempt to revolutionise our understanding of security. Rather, I seek a 
form of cooperative evolution through the inclusion and consideration of ‘non-
traditional’ – in this case critical and human security - perspectives in 
addressing today’s challenges. Bridging the divide between orthodox and non-
traditional perspectives though, must necessarily start with a substantive 
engagement between Critical and Human Security approaches. Such an 
engagement must appreciate that Human Security is fundamentally ‘critical’; 
and in doing so, overcome the chasm that exits between these approaches, 
which has thus far limited their respective ability to gain any relative 
mainstream resonance and traction.      
 
In analysing the relevance and utility of these non-traditional (Critical-
Human security) approaches I will consider such in respect to New Zealand’s 
Defence White Paper 2010. I will contend that despite the opportunity to create 
innovative and transformational policy that understands and responds 
effectively to the dynamics and challenges of today’s security environment, 
New Zealand’s security and defence policy and thinking remains structurally 
and philosophically fixed, and continues to be framed in overly orthodox 
terms. In this sense, the prevailing political discourse on security continues 
centre upon an economically and territorially safe and secure New Zealand; 
and it talks in terms of hard power national interests, national values and 
national security and defence. In all respects, the ‘state’ remains the 
fundamental and naturalised referent of Wellington’s security narratives to the 
near-exclusion of all other ‘constituencies’.91 In this respect, New Zealand’s 
persistence with a traditional and narrowly focussed state-centric approach to 
security risks the reinforcement of policies and practices that are increasingly 
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limited, limiting and ineffectual. This is particularly so in Defence White Paper 
2010’s (lack of) understanding and treatment of those security dynamics 
outlined in Chapter One. For its security to have contemporary relevance, and 
positive meaning and effect, New Zealand must ‘open space’ and embrace a 
more holistic, inclusive and comprehensively integrated approach to security. 
Fundamentally, this will require Wellington’s security policy community to 
overcome its seeming conceptual and institutional myopia and intransigence 
towards acknowledging that utility can be derived from alternative and non-
traditional security approaches when considered in complimentary – rather 
than dissonant and polarising – senses to State Security.    
 
Understanding security more holistically, and considering it in 
normatively progressive, open and inclusive ways, is to recognise – and 
mobilise – its universally transcendent and interdependent qualities. In this 
respect, I will further the contention that both state-centric and human-centic 
security approaches are necessary but not sufficient when considered 
exclusively. Rather, responding effectively to the complex challenges posed by 
the globalisation of security and the bifurcated security environment will 
require the development of an already evolving ‘dialectic’ between state-centric 
and human-centric securities that is mutually constitutive and reinforcing. 
Specifically, I will examine the value of Human Security as a ‘bridging’ and 
‘boundary’ concept in respect to its scope for normative influence on state 
security agendas and practice.  
 
State-centric Security 
 The need for state-centric security is not contested. What is challenged 
however, is the scope and form that prevailing state-centric approaches take in 
their understanding of, and response to contemporary challenges. It is widely 
acknowledged that the security challenges of the 21st Century are, in many 
respects, broader in scope and range, and more complex than the traditional 
national and international security institutions designed to manage them. New 
Zealand’s Defence White Paper 2010 tacitly acknowledged these structural, 
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policy and programmatic deficiencies, and the requirement to “magnify the 
national security effort” to deal with the realities of an increasingly 
heterogeneous security environment.92 Yet, while Rosenau suggests that a 
defining feature of this environment and contemporary security “will be the 
constant tension between greater interdependence and intensifying 
competition between individuals, communities and states,”93 there appears 
little empirical evidence to suggest that states are adapting their security 
approaches in more accommodating, open and inclusive ways. Rather, through 
their continuing primacy as policy-maker – and in spite of today’s diffuse and 
manifold security dynamics – states continue to assume and regulate the status 
of subjective referent, and hence, occupy the singular site of prominence, 
privilege and self interest within contemporary security equations.   
 
As a sign of Rosenau’s sense of “greater interdependence”, and 
notwithstanding its inherently contested nature as a conception, one measure 
of apparent consensus is that security exists, above all, as the human pursuit of 
and for ‘freedom.’  However, while security is increasingly viewed as a 
transcendent, universal and interdependent objective for all, the state – as the 
dominant ‘unit’ of order and organisation in an otherwise unregulated, 
anarchic world – continues to hold the somewhat privileged and exclusive 
status as the “natural focus of security concern.”94 This status, and the 
aggrandised role of the state in providing security, is further amplified when 
considered within an environment characterised by increasing strategic 
uncertainty, pressure and risk.95 Indeed, under such conditions, it is apparent 
that security “will remain [partly] dependent on nationally defined central 
actors, which are states.”96 Consequently, the state will continue to act as the 
principal agent for addressing (in)security, and the notion of State Security 
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retains an enduring – albeit diminished – sense of contemporary resonance and 
relevance.  
 
As noted, security is one of the ‘elementary or primary goals’ of social life, 
[for] without security … there can be no society.”97 As such, as I will later make 
clear, security must make sense at the basic individual level for it make sense in 
state, and broader international and global contexts.98 In seeking ‘freedom’ 
however, the idea of security is often reduced to traditional realpolitik concerns: 
the sharply defined and absolute ability of states to maintain their independent 
sovereign identity and functional integrity – ultimately through the use of 
military power and force, deterrence and coercion. Correspondingly, this 
‘absolute’ forms the core, almost exclusive and politically self-reflective focus of 
state security agendas and practices, wherein the most important – perceived – 
responsibility “of any Government is to ensure the security and territorial 
integrity of the nation, including protecting the institutions that sustain 
confidence, good governance, and prosperity.”99
 
Such a limited and limiting focus is reaffirmed and buttressed through 
prevailing theoretical orthodoxies which posit that the most important actors 
are sovereign states, which are rational and operate in an inherently 
competitive, anarchic and self-help environment. They present a distinctively 
narrow and linear – trend derived – security picture that consists of “the 
dominating significance of sovereign states, the drive of states to survive and 
maximise power, the expectation of interstate [competition], struggles crises, 
and war, and the sanctioning of military force as an instrument of policy.”100 In 
these respects, the notion of security is intrinsically fused to state centrality and 
sovereign survival, and thus, the maximisation of state security through the 
strategic pursuit of ‘national interests.’ Key to the centrality and survival of the 
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state, and the shaping of prevailing approaches to State Security, has been the 
notion of Sovereignty. This notion “has come to signify, in the Westphalian 
context, the legal identity of a state … It is a concept which provides order, 
stability and predictability in international relations; … [and] internally, 
sovereignty signifies the capacity to make authoritative with regard to people 
and resources within the territory of the state.”101 In a classical sense therefore, 
the orthodox notion of sovereignty has effectively legitimised the referent 
centrality and pre-eminent existence of the state; and in doing so, it has enabled 
the consolidation of power, security and politics at the level of the state.  
 
The inherent risk associated with such a reductionist consolidation at the 
level of the state however, is that it has the potential to perpetuate insecurity. 
This can occur through the marginalisation, or indeed exclusion or subjugation, 
of individuals and/or communities in deference to the state (and often state-
based regimes) – both within societies and states, and when ‘others’ are 
affected by states engaged in situations of competition or conflict. In this sense, 
orthodox state-centric approaches are proving increasingly limited, ineffectual 
and discordant with the realities of today’s security agenda. This becomes 
particularly evident when considered in the context of the range of diverse 
political, social and human security pressures that popular movements such as 
the “Arab awakening”102 and ‘Occupy Movement’ protests are highlighting.  
Importantly, it further serves to reinforce that – in the era of bifurcation and 
globalisation – people’s focussed, broader and deeper participation in the 
processes governing their lives is increasingly becoming a central issue of our 
time.  
 
Faith in a state’s ability to normatively provide for the security of its 
people is being steadily eroded by the persistence of exclusivist framed State 
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Security approaches; particularly as the globalisation and bifurcation of 
security continue to diverge from, and outpace the rate of change in state 
security policies and programmes. This evident loss of faith will have serious 
implications for the social ‘compact’ between the state and its citizens, and in 
our ability to continue to find common cause between the state and its people.  
Increasingly, people “have an urge – an impatient urge – to participate in 
processes that shape their lives. And that impatience brings many dangers and 
opportunities;”103 and dangers occur when the irresistible urge for human 
participation clashes with the seeming inflexibility of states, state-based 
regimes and international systems. Any determined resistance on the part of 
states to accommodate these new social and security dynamics could have 
potentially devastating impacts on its domestic constituency and existence, on 
its behaviour, and how it is perceived within the international system. Under 
these circumstances, as Booth contends, traditional – realist-derived – state 
security approaches  
 
“must be considered a failed project when judged by the high levels of insecurity in the 
world and the dire conditions in which many people live … As a political practice, 
[these approaches have] helped to construct and perpetuate a world politics that fails to 
provide security for the vast majority of people in the world.”104
   
In addressing this most fundamental of risks – and its consequences – the 
need to deepen our understanding of, and broaden our approaches to 
contemporary security becomes evermore apparent. This is particularly so 
given the bifurcation and globalisation of security, and in the corresponding 
acknowledgement that ‘power’ is increasingly less consolidated at the level of 
the state, and is becoming “more diffused, both vertically and horizontally.”105    
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With these factors in mind, and in returning to my point that security 
should be viewed as a transcendent, universal and interdependent objective for 
all, it becomes imperative that contemporary approaches reasonably include a 
critical regard to a substantial range of concerns about conditions of existence 
across all levels of human, social and political life. This requirement becomes 
particularly evident in light of the paradox wherein “the state remains the 
fundamental purveyor of security. Yet it often fails to fulfil its security 
obligations – and at times has even become a source of threat to its own [and 
other] people.”106 In many respects though, this paradox – and the litany of 
other limitations inherent in State Security approaches – could be addressed by 
the state’s recognition of its normative responsibility not just to provide for 
welfare, or representation, but principally, to ensure the security of their 
citizens.107 This is arguably the basic contract that establishes the security of the 
state, its citizens, and humanity in general in a mutually constitutive, albeit still 
relatively tacit compact. Though, in contemporary settings, the utility of this 
security compact continues to realise increasing relevance and resonance 
wherein a  
 
“state that protects its citizens and respects their rights is ultimately one that enjoys 
legitimacy and support … it is based on the idea that security – indeed politics and 
political debate as we know it – cannot flourish without first evacuating the threat of 
force and violence from public space. This is, arguably, true for all political, social and 
economic interactions, since where the threat of force and violence is omnipresent, 
society cannot flourish, politics cannot be democratic and representative, and markets 
cannot function.”108
  
 Under these conditions therefore, a focal objective of contemporary security 
must be to overcome the corrosive impacts that materialise with the persistence 
of objectively narrow, concentrated, and unchanging state-centric approaches.  
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In responding in more subjectively open and inclusive ways, I will 
contend that this objective can be more precisely addressed through the 
consideration and integration of more comprehensive and critical, human-
centred approaches to security. In this sense, as Burke surmises, “we are well 
into the ‘broadening and deepening’ phase of conceptualising security;”109 a 
phase which requires an approach that understands and responds to the 
bifurcation and globalisation of security, and the underlying dynamics and 
influences – as outlined in Chapter 1 – that are shaping the security challenges 
of today.     
 
A basis for evolution: Reconciling Critical approaches to Security and 
Human Security  
Both Critical approaches to Security and Human Security seek to 
challenge the state-centric orthodoxy of prevailing traditional security 
dialogues. They do so predominantly through their shared privileging of the 
‘individual’ as the referent and beneficiary of security analysis and practice, 
and by “de-essentialising and deconstructing prevailing claims about 
security.”110 Ultimately though, the binding factor is each approach’s 
commitment to the core objective of understanding and resolving the 
(in)security of real people in real places.111 Importantly, the cumulative impact 
of these non-traditional approaches, working together, has been to “open up 
space in the academic and policy worlds for new thinking about [contemporary 
security and insecurity.”112 Yet, despite their respective normative and 
utilitarian appeal, and similarities as non-traditional approaches to security, 
there has not yet been any measure of substantive engagement between Critical 
and Human security discourses. Indeed, as I will highlight, there exists what 
could be described as an active dissonance between the approaches that must 
be overcome if their same core objective is to be truly realised. To do so will 
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require Critical and Human Security proponents alike to seek opportunities for 
mutual recognition and cooperative engagement; while not remaining 
“overburdened by distant ideal structures, but [rather] concentrate on reformist 
steps to make a better world somewhat more likely.”113  
 
As an underlying theme of this Thesis – in the interests of achieving more 
inclusive and positive security outcomes for ‘All’ – I will advance the position 
that traditional and non-traditional approaches to security should no longer be 
viewed as inimical. Rather, we must seek to establish a common ground in 
ways that transcend ‘disciplinary’ boundaries by understanding and bridging 
the philosophical and conceptual divides that persist between these, often 
disparate, groupings. To do so however, first requires that a pragmatic 
intellectual and practical reconciliation of sorts occurs within the non-
traditional security stream as a basis for evolution.  
 
In this sense, before any meaningful discussion can be had on the utility of 
Critical and Human Security approaches in positively influencing and 
transforming the contemporary security agenda, it is first necessary to 
understand and reconcile the tensions that exist between these approaches.  To 
do so is to recognise the intrinsic relationship between Critical and Human 
Security. As Newman presciently observed, Human security is in itself 
fundamentally ‘critical’, albeit with an emphasis on a pragmatic policy-oriented 
approach which attempts to improve the human condition and welfare within 
the political, legal and practical parameters of the ‘real world.’ 
Correspondingly, most Critical approaches – with the exception of anti-
foundational and some postmodernist conceptions – claim to be practical in 
effect, and in their engagement with ‘real world’ security issues.114  
 
The limiting sense of dissonance between Critical and Human Security 
approaches can be attributed to a number of key factors that explain such a lack 
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of engagement. A core distinction between the approaches stems from the 
Critical view that Human Security, while normatively attractive, is both 
theoretically unsophisticated and analytically weak. Detractors argue that the 
expansive approach to human security has the potential to undermine its 
effectiveness, and that this expansiveness “renders the concept analytically 
incoherent and robs it of [any theoretical and practical precision and] 
utility.”115 This broad approach has attracted the greatest degree of criticism for 
as Paris and Acharya observe:  
 
“existing definitions of human security tend to be extraordinarily expansive and vague, 
encompassing everything from physical security to psychological wellbeing, which 
provides policymakers with little guidance in the prioritisation of competing policy 
goals and academics with little sense of what, exactly, is to be studied.”116  
 
In this context, such alleged conceptual underdevelopments and analytical 
limitations within Human Security have underpinned the Critical claims of 
theoretical weakness, and in turn can contribute to explaining the failure of 
Human Security to make a more significant impact on Security theory.  
 
Exacerbating the delta between Critical and Human Security – and the 
factor that could paradoxically draw the two approaches closer – is Human 
Security’s policy and problem-solving orientation. Human Security 
scholarship, generally, does not seek to engage with the epistemological, 
ontological or methodological issues and debates surrounding security that 
seem to preoccupy their Critical Security contemporaries. Whereas Critical 
approaches explicitly question – and deconstruct – the ideas of ‘security’ and 
‘reality’, and directly challenge the legitimacy of prevailing constructions of 
power, privilege, interest and knowledge, Human Security approaches tend to 
be more pragmatic in finding solutions to today’s security challenges.  
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Human Security scholars and practitioners – while challenging prevailing 
notions of security – do not tend to fundamentally question existing structures 
and institutions. Rather, they have adopted a practical policy-oriented and 
problem-solving basis that takes “prevailing social relationships, and the 
institutions into which they are organised, as the given and inevitable 
framework for action.”117 Many within the Human Security community 
prioritise practical progress in human welfare above the objective of critical 
deconstruction; indeed, practitioners the like of Sadako Ogata, have been 
adamant that human security should be focussed on practical security impacts 
rather than pure theorising. In this sense, and as will be discussed in detail, 
Human Security approaches seek to remain policy relevant and influential, and 
accessible to prevailing national and international security policy circles and 
institutions. As a result, such approaches have been “reluctant to explore 
overtly ‘critical’ themes, either because they feel they are unnecessary, or 
because they fear that such theoretical pursuits will alienate them – and their 
message – from the policy world.”118 At the same time, Critical approaches 
have been circumspect towards engaging with human security ideas and 
approaches because they are considered to be theoretically lacking in 
coherence,  statist and hence ‘uncritical.’ Thus, any “dialogue would inevitable 
amount to replicating old ways of thinking and undermine the integrity of the 
critical security agenda. [Consequently], the claim of critical security 
approaches to be practical and policy relevant is problematic because of this 
reluctance to engage in problem-solving dialogue.”119     
 
As the Buddhist proverb proclaims “together we can accomplish more 
than each of us”, so Critical and Human Security approaches could learn and 
leverage more from one another. Human Security could benefit from 
developing theoretically and conceptually, whereas Critical approaches must 
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seek opportunities to realise and maximise their practical potential and impact 
on ‘real world’ security challenges. In exploring and promoting this idea, 
Human Security, given its problem solving basis and likely policy relevance, 
could be used as a conduit or ‘bridge’ for advancing critical and other non-
traditional perspectives. To have any enduring and positively meaningful effect 
however, Human Security conceptions must acknowledge and address the 
inherent weaknesses within their own policy-oriented, problem solving 
approaches. Notably, Human Security must evolve from being primarily 
‘consequentialist’ in effect  – an outcome that has the potential to promote and 
exacerbate insecurity and human suffering by replicating and reinforcing the 
pathological, structural and institutional sources of such. In overcoming this 
risk, I will advocate Human Security must learn from and accommodate 
‘critical’ methodologies that are more ‘revisionist’ in their analysis and 
understanding of the ‘true’ origins of insecurity.120 Specifically, I will contend 
that addressing today’s array of security challenges requires the consideration 
of critical perspectives, and that Human Security could serve as the most 
effective agency by which to realise transformative influence upon the 
contemporary security agenda, and within prevailing state-centric security 
approaches.   
                
Transforming the Agenda: A Critically informed approach to Security 
 As the twenty-first Century unfolds, all states continue to be challenged 
by a diverse array of geo-strategic imperatives and risks. For New Zealand, 
these conditions are likely to amplify and intensify in the era of the ‘Asia-
Pacific Century.’ But increasingly, and unavoidably, New Zealand is also 
confronting a relatively new class of complex and adaptive security challenges. 
These challenges are pervasive and cross-cutting, simultaneously engaging the 
nation’s social, economic and political systems and linkages, both domestically 
and internationally. These ‘traditional’ and ‘non-traditional’ challenges present 
risks to collective (state) and individual (human) securities. Ominously, many 
are projected to proliferate and converge, thus posing an intricate web with 
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potentially catastrophic outcomes.121 Indeed, the United Nations High Level 
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change has framed this millennium’s global 
security agenda around a nexus of threats and risks to both state and human 
security. Broadly conceived, these risks and threats include: violent conflict 
between and within states, including civil wars, large-scale human rights 
abuses and genocide; poverty, infectious diseases and environmental 
degradation; the continued proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction; and 
the increasingly pervasive influence of non-state actors in the form of terrorism 
and transnational crime.122
 
 Addressing these realities demands New Zealand embrace a 
comprehensive and inclusive reconceptualisation of security that is fit for 
today’s settings. In this sense, “it is almost no longer controversial to say that 
traditional [state-centric] conceptions of security were (and in many minds still 
are) too narrowly focussed.”123 Indeed, even ardent realists and committed 
proponents of traditional approaches to security, such as Henry Kissinger, 
acknowledge the contemporary limitations of parochial State Security 
discourses in “no longer defin[ing] our perils or our possibilities.”124  
 
In many respects however, the continued prevalence of old thinking about 
politics, power and security risks the replication of old practices; the means 
recommended by traditional theories have the potential to ensure that the end 
will be the same old world with the same old dangers – and perhaps worse.125 
Consequently, establishing a precise and unbiased understanding of our 
contemporary security challenges – and their complex dynamics and 
interdependencies – is essential to the formulation of effective policies and 
programmes. This sense of ‘understanding’ must necessarily form the 
foundation of, and for any relevant reconceptualisation of security in 
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universally open, indivisibly inclusive, and progressive ways.  In today’s 
world, unless there is a greater consideration and integration of marginalised 
security conceptions, and unless the same logic “can be extended to the 
construction of new regimes of security, which recognise that security is 
mutually constitutive and interdependent, then security is unlikely to prove 
sustainable.”126 In this respect, an approach to security that is more critical in 
its perspectives, has the potential to provide New Zealand – and all states – 
with a sound basis for conceiving this ‘understanding’, and for realising greater 
measures of political and social inclusion and progress.  
 
Critically informed approaches to security stand “outside and questions 
the political and social phenomena it is examining. It avoids, as far as possible, 
the negative consequences of … legitimising and replicating the regressive 
aspect of prevailing situations normally associated with traditional and 
prevailing approaches to security.” 127 Rather, the utility of, and positive value 
derived from critical approaches stem from their emancipatory potential and 
capacity to unlock the notion from the orthodoxy’s imposed image of a 
singular, static and limiting state-centric ‘reality’. Accordingly, more critically 
informed approaches assume an “instrumental value that enables people(s) 
some opportunity to choose how to live. It is a means by which individuals and 
collectivities can invent and reinvent different ideas about [security, and 
ultimately,] being human.”128 Importantly though, critically informed 
perspectives should be viewed as more than an alternatives to, or arguments 
against the prevailing orthodoxy; rather, in a more integrative and inclusive 
sense, they ask “deeper questions about the basic categories we use to think 
about, and conceptualise, security issues.”129   
 
As the term “critical” implies, by standing outside the ‘given’ frameworks 
and units of analysis they are exploring, critical approaches first seek to 
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appraise and understand these frameworks and units in terms of their origins, 
complex properties and dynamics. This understanding provides the basis for 
the development of more objectively “realistic” accounts of the phenomena 
associated with the globalisation and bifurcation of security, and ultimately, for 
the formulation of effective responses to them. Importantly, here, Critical 
approaches understand that contemporary “security is not an objective 
condition, that threats to it are not simply a matter of correctly perceiving a 
constellation of material forces, and that the object of security is neither stable 
nor unchanging.”130 Rather, Critical approaches highlight that contemporary 
security conceptions should be context contingent. In doing so, these 
approaches directly challenge orthodox security notions that narrow their 
inquiry towards the exclusive privileging of state-centric views.  
 
Critical approaches interrogate such narrow views by directly challenging 
the underlying assumptions that continue to frame mainstream security 
discourse by highlighting the contradictions and limitations of traditional 
security orthodoxies. They achieve this “by asking questions that shift the focus 
of concern away from the specifications of [state] security preoccupied with 
states as the only, or most important, actors in matters of security.”131 
Consequently, in seeking a more meaningful, transparent and relevant 
appreciation of security today, the objective of such critique is to move the 
notion beyond its prevailing strictures in ways that allow both security and 
insecurity to be understood and addressed more directly.  
 
Understanding security within contemporary settings requires us to 
acknowledge the fundamental need to critically focus, broaden and deepen our 
perspectives. Indeed, such calls – both tacitly and explicitly – are realising 
increasing measures of resonance and traction. By example, the ‘Copenhagen’ 
and ‘Welsh’ schools have both argued – albeit from differing vantage points – 
of the need to expand and compliment mainstream conceptions from their 
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limits and limitations of parochial state-centrism, by including a range of 
broader and interdependent local and global systemic connections. Indeed, 
Headley Bull, during his lifetime, argued for broader common perspectives 
that would transcend the narrow notions of security by looking to a deeper 
logic of human, social and systemic interdependence. 132  
 
Notably, against the backdrop of transformations in the Asia-Pacific’s geo-
strategic outlook, United States President Obama normatively broadened his 
nation’s perspective to include the “security and dignity of people around the 
world.”133 This is a position subsequently buttressed within the context of the 
most recent strategic guidance in which Obama seeks the recognition of the 
duality and dialectic that should, and must exist between state and critical-
human security approaches.   In doing so, he explicitly understands that for 
security to have legitimate relevance and meaning, it must be dialectically 
founded upon “a just and sustainable international order where the rights and 
responsibilities of nations and peoples are upheld, especially the fundamental 
rights of every human being.”134 From Critical and Human Security 
perspectives – analytical ‘optimism’ notwithstanding – Obama’s address and 
statement could be considered normatively significant for a range of reasons. 
Foremost, his comments can be viewed as marker in his nation’s 
reconceptualisation of security via a normative reaffirmation of the compact 
that should exist between a state and its people. While noting that “every 
nation will chart its own course”, Obama caveats and cautions that states which 
fail in their duty to provide security and universal freedoms for their citizenry 
– pillars of Critical and Human Security approaches – risk ultimate failure as 
states; and failure will result where states “ignore the ultimate source of their 
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power and legitimacy – the will of the people.”135 Correspondingly, in 
understanding the inherent and normative role of the state in providing 
security to individuals, Obama also recognised, in the era of globalisation and 
bifurcation,  that any state “efforts to advance security, prosperity and human 
dignity” must necessarily be situated in the context of “an interconnected 
world, [wherein] we all rise and fall together.”136 This initial shift in the 
meaning and understanding that is ascribed to security could be considered as 
signifying a crucial first – but furtive – step on the part of the statist orthodoxy 
to acknowledge the need to embrace focussed, broader, deeper, comprehensive 
and more critically reflective conceptions that are attuned to the security 
challenges and opportunities of today. Understanding such, is to critically – 
and fundamentally – recognise the emancipatory “aspirations and rights of all 
peoples.”137  
 
In overcoming systemic and relational imbalances and limitations, a 
hallmark of Critical approaches is that they seek “escape [from] the confines of 
privileged referents by embracing no static interest save that of the primordial 
human being and the species in nature.”138 Correspondingly, Critical 
approaches conceive security by comprehensive measures and in 
comprehensive ways. These approaches do so, generally, by embracing 
multiple levels of society – from the individual, to the state, to all humankind – 
with a view to developing more promising ideas by which to overcome 
oppressive circumstances, and structural and contingent human wrongs.139 As 
agents of structural, social and political emancipation, Critical approaches 
derive much of their value by drawing from a progressive and inclusive 
agenda that is at once broader, deeper, and more focussed than traditional 
state-centric security conceptions.  
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In contrast to mainstream security theory, concept and practice – derived 
from a “combination of statist, militarised, masculinised, top-down, 
methodologically positivist, and philosophically realist thinking”140 – critical 
conceptions aim to develop approaches that are dedicated to the promotion of 
human, social and political ‘emancipation’. Such approaches have led to the 
critical analysis of contemporary forms of domination, subjugation, 
marginalisation and insecurity that have either been ignored or have fallen 
outside the philosophical and/or theoretical domains of narrow statist security 
traditions and agendas. Indeed it is hoped that opening up security in this way 
will result in the construction of a more comprehensive and critically informed 
approach to security that is reflective of, and responsive to today’s security 
realities; and an approach in which the notions of emancipation and security 
are viewed holistically and as “two sides of the same coin.”141.  
 
Realising this objective necessarily involves a reconceptualisation of 
security that is (a) Focussed: seeking a theory and practice of security that 
promotes emancipatory politics, policies and programmes; (b) Deeper: 
interrogating the attitudes and behaviours that shape our respective 
understanding and conception(s) of security; recognising that these are 
derivative of underlying and contested theories about the nature of security; 
and appreciating that different perspectives will naturally deliver different 
conceptions of what security means – or should mean – in social, political and 
socio-political contexts and forms; and (c) Broader: understanding – particularly 
in contemporary settings – the need to expand the agenda of security beyond 
that of the prevailing statist, militarised orthodoxy wherein threat and the use 
of material force is neither the only (or necessarily most exigent) threat to 
security, nor the only means of providing security. Rather, broadening requires 
the concordat exploration of common humanity and emancipation and 
sovereignty and power.142        
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Importantly here, it should be understood that such a critically-based 
reconceptualisation is derived from the development of more ontologically and 
epistemologically reflective bodies of ‘security’ knowledge and understanding. 
Fundamentally, this reconceptualisation is based on the ‘nature of being’ – 
what really exists in the social world.143 In adopting such a rationale, Critical 
approaches seek to objectively identify and explore the inherent weaknesses 
and limitations of prevailing state-centric security approaches. They do so 
through their application of, generally, more discursive methods of analysis 
and critique – rather than pointed and unreflective criticism – to challenge 
orthodoxies.  The corresponding value of Critical approaches is derived from 
their exploration of the immanent potential for transformational reforms to 
prevailing ideas, structures and systems, rather than necessarily advocating 
systematic wholesale change. As such, while many Critical and Human 
Security approaches acknowledge the fundamental role states will continue to 
play within ‘security’; they also recognise – via the discursive processes of 
focussing, broadening, deepening and reflective critique – that security must be 
reconceptualised in more universally inclusive and comprehensive ways if 
humankind is to effectively understand and address the array of complex 
challenges we now face.   
 
Human Security 
 As highlighted, contemporary security discourses and practices should 
realistically “reflect the consequences of a globalised security environment that 
has bifurcated between an older state-centric world on the one hand and 
between new trans-state and sub-state strata on the other hand.”144 
Consequently, as Newman argues, “traditional conceptions of state security – 
premised upon military defence of territorial integrity – are a necessary but not 
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sufficient condition of human welfare.”145 In addressing this void in 
contemporary security thinking and practice, Critical approaches – and by 
extension: Human Security – are committed to understanding and resolving 
the (in)security of real people in real places. Their potency is in illuminating 
those threats and vulnerabilities which transcend geo-political borders, and 
structural, material notions of state power and interest. In doing so, Critical 
approaches and Human Security focus on identifying and understanding 
adverse and traumatic conditions and events in terms of their impact and 
influence on individuals, societies, and broader humankind; and, through 
understanding, addressing these issues in comprehensively open, inclusive and 
positively enduring ways.146 Importantly though, Human Security does so by 
neither deligitimising the state without due cause, nor by devaluing state 
sovereignty and interest. Rather, the utility of Human Security is derived from 
placing both the state and notion of sovereignty in contemporary settings 
where their relative value as security referents and agents can be more 
accurately assessed and optimised. In this sense, Critical approaches, and – in 
particular – Human Security requires a view that places the individual, the 
state and society and the international system into a mutually constitutive 
relationship. Notwithstanding the prevailing centrality of states in the context 
of security, individual, domestic and international dynamics are essential to 
contemporary security analysis and understanding, as are the complex 
(inter)relationships between them.147
 
 In many respects, Human Security has evolved as a transformational and 
normative leitmotif of non-traditional and critical approaches to security. 
Human Security seeks for humankind “freedom from want, freedom from fear 
and the freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy natural environment 
– these are the interrelated building blocks of human and therefore national 
                                                 
145 E. Newman, ‘A normatively attractive but analytically weak concept’, in Security Dialogue, 
Vol 35(30), 2004, p.358. 
146 see Christie, op.cit., 2010, p.170. 
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security.”148 The concept recognises and looks to positively redress old 
thinking about politics, power and security that guarantees the replication of 
old practices; wherein the means recommended by traditional theories ensure 
that the end could be the same old world with the same old dangers – and 
perhaps worse.149  Consequently, many security ‘communities’, are coming to 
perceive and conceive contemporary security agendas and practices through 
the incorporation of critical and human security perspectives within prevailing 
approaches and frameworks. By example, some of the most salient 
representations of such transformation have been witnessed through the 
formalised recognition of Human Security by multilateral institutions such as 
the United Nations and ASEAN; via the establishment of a myriad of non-
governmental international Human Security-focussed advocacy groups and 
academic institutions; and through the creation of a cooperative – state-level – 
Human Security network that includes Japan, Norway, Canada and Jordan 
amongst its membership.        
 
 As highlighted, Human Security exists as a powerful, but controversial 
and intensely contested idea that resonate a profound concern for human 
emancipation through an appreciation that ‘security’ is one of the elementary 
or primary goals of social life.150 Indeed, many strands of Human Security 
thinking purports that a people-centred view of security is necessary for state 
and global stability. Inherently, human security seeks to focus, broaden and 
deepen prevailing traditional security discourses through an increasing 
recognition of the proposition that “security must make sense at the basic level 
of the individual human being for it to make sense at the international level.”151 
Yet, as discussed, while the Human Security “concept evokes progressive 
values,”152 there exists inherent conceptual, policy and practical risks in 
expanding our notions of security through the securitisation of non-traditional 
                                                 
148 UN Commission on Human Security, Human security now, UNDP, 2003, P.4. 
149 see Booth in Booth(ed), op.cit., 2005, p.273. 
150 see Williams in Bellamy(ed), op.cit., p. 135. 
151 McSweeney, Security, op.cit., p. 16.  
152 A. Suhrke, ‘Human Security and the Interests of States’, in Security Dialogue, Vol 30, No 3, 
1999, p. 265. 
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domains; in the broadening of agendas beyond what is “analytically 
meaningful or useful as a tool of policymaking;”153 and in the subsequent 
prioritisation and allocation of resources to treat the sources, effects and 
consequences of insecurity. However, as I will demonstrate, despite concerns 
amongst its critics that the conception is both vague and utopian, and therefore 
impossible to operationalise in policy, programmatic and practical senses, 
Human Security’s greatest potential remains in its holistic, evolutionary 
innovative nature, that is at once underpinned by its emancipatory, ‘bridging’ 
and paradigm-shifting properties.154 Indeed, I will go further by supporting the 
contention that there does – and should – exist a dialectic between state and 
human-centric security approaches that offers a “promising way of addressing 
the cotemporary security agenda of state, trans-state and intra-state security 
issues and the connections between them.”155
 
The evolution of Human Security is an explicit acknowledgment that the 
“concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of 
territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests. It has 
been related more to nation-states than to people.”156 Correspondingly, the 
idea of human security rests on a number of core propositions where security is 
a both a people-centred and universal concern. Components of human security 
are interdependent and circulatory, wherein severe threats to human security 
are not confined to single communities and/or states. These approaches 
promote sustainable development – rather than structural violence and 
militarised recourses – as the foundation for peace and security within and 
between states.157 In this sense, Human Security demonstrates its normative 
and transformational properties by calling into question prevailing social and 
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power relationships and the frameworks and institutions into which they are 
organised.  
 
Human Security’s central concern is with the legitimisation of a 
substantive redefinition of the notion of ‘security,’ in which security is 
recognised as a fundamentally ‘social construction.’158 Human Security seeks a 
broadening of the contemporary security discourse by placing the individual – 
or people collectively – as a referent of security, rather than, although not 
necessarily in opposition to, the institution of state, and notions such as 
territory and sovereignty. This does not mean however that there has been a 
complete break with the state, with most current Human Security work in fact 
arguing that the state remains the most effective guarantor of people’s human 
security needs.159 In this respect, and as I will address later, for any 
contemporary security conception to establish and maintain any form of 
enduring effectiveness and relevance, it must recognise ‘people’ and states as 
the mutually constitutive referents of security. In doing so, such a concept must 
necessarily respond to “the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought 
security in their daily lives … [wherein] a feeling of insecurity arises more from 
worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event.”160 
Resultantly, Human Security considers a broad range of conditions that 
threaten survival, livelihood and dignity, and identifies thresholds below 
which humanity and life is intolerably and irredeemably threatened. Moreover, 
human security increasingly emphasises the interconnectedness of both threats 
and responses when addressing these insecurities.161  
 
In response, Human Security necessarily and naturally seeks the 
realisation of individual freedoms – emancipation – through the establishment 
of normative institutions and regimes, and the resourcing of practical 
                                                 
158 see M. Neufeld, ‘Pitfalls of Emancipation and Discourses of Security: Reflections on 
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development projects that support the fulfilment of human social emancipation 
and empowerment. In doing so, emancipation and empowerment entails the 
measured redistribution of power, and in the way that power, security and 
protections are conceived and exercised. Importantly, such redistribution must 
seek to ensure the security of individuals and communities and serve the 
interests of state and global stability. It follows therefore, that empowerment 
and “emancipation, empirically, [are] security.”162 By extension, these fused 
ideas “attempt to empower the disenfranchised and to give a voice to those that 
have been traditionally silenced. [Emancipation and empowerment] means 
freeing people, as individuals and groups, from the social, physical, economic, 
political, and other constraints that stop them from carrying out what they 
would freely choose to do.”163 In many respects, these normative notions are 
realising increased political and social resonance through the means of 
international and state-based human security policies and programmes, with 
“a defining characteristic of the human security idea being its policy relevance, 
its engagement with policy, and its desire to change security policy is 
progressive ways.”164 Fundamentally though, it can be argued that the 
stimulants driving emancipation and empowerment – and broader human 
security – are the long-running transformational processes of globalisation, 
bifurcation and interdependence. These processes are correspondingly 
affecting our prevailing conceptions of the state, sovereignty, and conflict, and 
in doing so, they are simultaneously undermining the plausibility of traditional 
and exclusive state-centric notions of security.165
 
Human Security stands as a salient and manifest representation of, and 
response to such interconnected and transformational conditions. It represents 
an increasingly explicit acknowledgement and affirmation that for Security to 
make sense, it must be considered a socially constructed concept that realises 
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specific meaning within a specific social context.166 The profound implication 
here being, as Hedley Bull noted, that security “is one of the ‘elementary or 
primary goals’ of social life – [for] without security … there can be no 
society.”167 Critically, such a contention (re)establishes the symbiotic 
relationship between notions of state and human security, and necessarily 
emphasises the proposition that “security must make sense at the basic level of 
the individual human being for it to make sense at the international level.”168 In 
this respect, there exists an inherent dialectic and duality between state and 
human security values, ideals and aspirations. 
 
Security, in terms of the state, society and the individual, singularly 
implies survival and freedom as their ultimate criteria. In this respect, a “state 
that loses its sovereignty does not survive as a state; a society [– and the 
individuals within –] that loses its identity fears that it will no longer be able to 
live as itself.”169 As Bajpai recognises: 
 
 “if sovereignty of the state is at the heart of the traditional national security 
conception, so sovereignty of the individual is at the heart of human security. If 
national security is, at base, about territorial integrity or protection of the body politic, 
so human security is, at base, about physical integrity or protection of the individual 
human body from harm. If national security is also about political freedom of a state to 
chose its diplomatic partners/adversaries and to regulate its internal affairs, so also 
human security is about political freedom of an individual to associate with others 
(civic freedom) as well as the freedom to live private life without undue interference 
from fellow citizens and state authorities.”170  
 
Human Security therefore, naturally connects several kinds of individual 
freedoms. As discussed, the concept necessarily situates the notion of human 
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‘emancipation and empowerment’ at its core. The fused ideas attempt to 
empower the disenfranchised and to give a voice to those that have 
traditionally been silenced. From this, in its broadest sense, Human Security 
seeks to sanctify the individual – or people collectively – as a legitimate referent 
of security in a mutually constitutive relationship with the state. However, for 
such a relationship to exist necessarily implies the state – when its instruments 
of power are applied in comprehensive, cooperative, moral, ethical and 
humane ways – can and should remain the most effective guarantors of human 
security. Further, the causes, characteristics and effects of the globalisation and 
bifurcation of security would seem to demand holistic and integrated 
perspectives which recognise that “[state] security is influenced in important 
ways by dynamics at the level of individual and the global system.”171  
 
A useful explanation of this normative idea of state and human security 
interdependence, and its harmonising and transformational qualities, is framed 
in the redefining notion of ‘sovereignty as responsibility.’ “Although more 
people today are threatened by their own state than by other peoples’, that 
does not mean that the state cannot fulfil a positive role in pursuing human 
security.”172 ‘Sovereignty as Responsibility’ and the attendant ‘Responsibility to 
Protect’ represent the first influential attempt at state and policy levels to 
recognise and codify the ‘universal nature of survival’ and thus, the unified 
compact that should exist between state and human securities. These notions 
imply the re-characterisation of the absolute and exclusivist Westphalian 
interpretation, from sovereignty as control to sovereignty as responsibility in both 
internal functions and external duties. In this sense, thinking of (state) 
sovereignty as a responsibility, and primary responsibility for the protection of 
its citizens, assumes a positively compounding significance: 
 
“First, it implies that the state authorities are responsible for the functions of protecting 
the safety and lives of citizens and promotion of their welfare. Secondly, it suggests that 
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the national political authorities are responsible to the citizens internally and to the 
international community through the UN. And thirdly, it means that the agents of 
state are responsible for their actions; that is to say, they are accountable for their acts 
of commission and omission. The case for thinking of sovereignty in these terms is 
strengthened by the ever-increasing impact of human rights norms, and the increasing 
impact in international discourse of the concept of human security.”173  
 
It is becoming increasingly recognised therefore, that the “human impact of 
[state and] international actions cannot be regarded as collateral to other 
actions, but must be a central preoccupation for all concerned.”174  
 
Despite the normative appeal of Human Security, Sovereignty as 
Responsibility, the Responsibility to Protect, and the allied resolve at the 
international systemic level to embrace these conceptions, they remain, in many 
respects, theoretically and structurally problematic, socio-politically divisive 
and aspirational at best. “For some, [Sovereignty as Responsibility] heralds a 
new world in which human rights trumps state sovereignty; for others, it 
ushers in a world in which big powers ride roughshod over the smaller ones, 
manipulating the rhetoric of humanitarianism and human rights.”175 In this 
sense, the controversy highlights the basic divisions within the international 
community and security theory and practice, while reinforcing the 
predominance of state-centrism. In such circumstances, the essence of Human 
security remains bound to the willingness or otherwise of states and their 
narrow rationalised interests and “siloed” institutions, in either adopting or 
ratifying the principles which it engenders. 
 
In a critical sense, the co-option of human security into a state-focussed 
framework is dubious, in that such conceptions remain largely inconsistent 
with the normative concerns inherent in the human security agenda.176 
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Through a broadening and deepening of the security discourse, where security 
must be decoupled from the ‘national interests’ and tied to ‘universal concerns’ 
of all people,177 a defining feature of human security is its capacity to identify 
and interrogate what makes people insecure. However, ‘co-option’ in this 
instance assumes the politicisation of the notion. This risks limiting the 
emancipatory potential of Human Security, and threatens to “re-legitimise the 
very social structures (states and international society) that create insecurity 
and limit the potential for alleviating suffering, wherever it may be.”178  
 
Further exacerbating the dilemmas facing Human Security, is the claim 
that such an expansive approach renders the concept analytically incoherent 
and robs it of any practical and policy utility.179 In this context, conceptual 
overstretch engenders three critical problems: it has the potential to generate 
and represent false security hopes, priorities and consequences; it can establish 
confusion about the epistemological and ontological origins and causes of 
insecurity; and it can paradoxically contribute to the adoption of narrow – 
rather than comprehensive – ‘solutions’ to security challenges. The most 
difficult task in this respect becomes therefore, the operationalising of strategies 
to protect persons against physical violence in all circumstances and situations 
of conflict.180  Exploring these security dynamics of security demonstrates the 
complexity and tensions of attempting to synthesise normative human security 
approaches with and within traditional public policy frameworks. However, 
despite the legitimate concerns surrounding Human security’s conceptual and 
practical limitations, the notion’s value and utility is derived from its critically 
self-reflective, transformational, bridging and emancipatory properties. 
Normatively speaking, in its setting of a broader – more comprehensive – 
agenda than traditional approaches, Human Security has the potential to offer 
more ethical, and socially and politically progressive and inclusive perspectives 
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in a fractious era. Resultantly, Human Security – given its fundamentally 
critical basis – offers a more self-conscious and sophisticated form of analysis 
than prevailing security approaches, and so promises to be more “realistic” in 
accounting for and addressing contemporary political and security 
phenomena.181
 
Ultimately, Human Security’s true value stems from its goal centred on 
the progressive freeing of individuals and groups from structural and 
contingent human wrongs.  Yet, within contemporary settings and particularly 
in the post ‘9/11’ era, there is a growing recognition amongst the citizenries of 
states – particularly in the developed world – that their respective ways of life, 
and the specific liberties to which they had been accustomed are now 
increasingly vulnerable to state exploitation, manipulation and control in the 
name and interests of ‘security’.  By example, this circumstance has become 
increasingly apparent as a result of the negative processes of political 
‘securitisation.’182 Such a process frames an issue/group/individual as an 
existential threat – predicated upon an “‘us’ against ‘them’ distinction and logic 
of threat”183 - and has the dangerous capacity to “place an issue above the rules 
of normal liberal democratic politics, and hence justify emergency action to do 
whatever is necessary to remedy the situation.”184 Practically speaking, 
‘emergency actions’ can, and have, included the implementation of 
questionable – if not illiberal – laws, policies and processes that limit, suspend, 
or result in a basic forfeiture of fundamental human security, freedoms and 
rights in the name of state-centred security interests.185 Exploring the dynamics 
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of this isolated security issue speaks to an array of broader polemic 
complexities and challenges associated with establishing what Martin Wight 
has termed a ‘via media’, or broad accord between differing traditions of state-
centred and human-centred security thought and practice.186 Critically, despite 
the increasing focus on civil societies/communities and the individual – 
underpinned by the pervasive influences associated with the globalisation and 
bifurcation of security – states, the international system and predominant 
international relations theory and practice fail to adequately consider, 
accommodate contemporary security realities. The case of the 2010 New 
Zealand Defence White Paper demonstrates these complexities and challenges, 
and the attendant institutional myopia and intransigence that appear as key 
inhibitors to recognising the utility of alternative security approaches and 
perspectives, and ultimately the emancipation of broader humanity.  
 
The New Zealand case study is the most recent contemporary 
representation of opportunities missed or simply ignored in critically 
harmonising state and human securities. In maintaining a traditional and 
narrow security focus on the material defence of national interests, I will 
demonstrate that the Defence White Paper 2010 has failed in its duty to fully 
comprehend and comprehensively respond to the ‘realities’ of the 
contemporary security environment, and its attendant sources of threat and 
insecurity. In doing so, the strategic risk New Zealand faces is the 
establishment of discordant security and defence policies and programmes that 
are singularly ineffectual and irrelevant.  Consequently, in failing to 
understand and effectively address today’s security dynamics, Defence White 
Paper 2010 conversely risks perpetuating elevated levels of state and human 
insecurity, and the further marginalisation of already disenfranchised 
individuals and communities. In this sense, I will argue that Defence White Paper 
2010 exhibits a troubling and increasing delta that exists between statist 
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conceptions of security at the strategy and policy level, and the contrasted 
realities of the contemporary security environment that are shaping practical 
and operational/program level doctrines and responses which, in turn, are 
being increasingly influenced by critical and human security considerations.187     
 
For its defence and security policies to have an enduringly positive and 
relevant purpose, I will contend that New Zealand’s security ‘elite’ must move 
beyond its traditional geostrategic and hard power considerations, and 
embrace more ‘focussed, broader and deeper’ conceptual and policy 
pragmatics which are comprehensive in their objectives and effects, and that 
appropriately reflect today’s security realities. In doing so, I will demonstrate 
that that a most appropriate basis for realising these security outcomes for New 
Zealand, rests upon a recognition of the interdependence, and albeit, presently 
tense dialectic that exists between state and critical-human approaches to 
security. Correspondingly, recognition and understanding of this complex 
relationship, forms the necessary starting point for the establishment of a 
security ‘via media’, centred upon the critical utilisation of Human Security as 
a ‘boundary’ conception. The adoption of such an approach has the normative 
capacity to more effectively address the security interests of New Zealand and 
New Zealanders, while delivering more relevant and universally inclusive 
security outcomes for all humanity.       
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CASE STUDY: RETHINKING NEW ZEALAND SECURITY – A CRITICAL 
ANALYSIS OF THE NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE WHITE PAPER 2010  
 On the morning of Saturday the 2nd of November 2011, aboard HMNZS 
Canterbury and flanked by elite of New Zealand’s Security and Defence 
communities, Prime Minister John Key formally launched the latest official 
statement on the nation’s defence and security outlook, imperatives and 
interests in the period to 2035. From a governmental perspective, Defence White 
Paper 2010, is perceived as a seminal work in the context of New Zealand 
security and defence, representing the first “comprehensive statement” on the 
field in some thirteen years, although analysts such as Ayson convincingly 
suggest that this White Paper “really deserves to be treated as the first of its 
kind in nearly two decades.”188 Indeed, as Ayson further observed, it “was 
something of an understatement then for Dr Wayne Mapp, then Minister of 
Defence, to inform his cabinet colleagues in March 2009 that there had “not 
been any substantive review of defence policy since 2001.”189  
 
The Defence White Paper 2010 represents New Zealand’s first extensive 
formal examination and statement on security and defence since the catalysing 
events of 11 September 2001 significantly – if not fundamentally – altered the 
global security environment. Accordingly, in launching Defence White Paper 
2010, Dr Mapp appropriately recognised that both New Zealand’s region and 
the broader world are experiencing a significant period of transition, and facing 
unprecedented challenges wherein “the past thirteen years since the last White 
Paper there have been immense changes in the global … security landscape … 
and the next twenty-five years will see that rate of change continue.”190 Indeed 
in this respect, as Greener affirms, “much has changed in the last decade and 
                                                 
188 R. Ayson, ‘Strategic Objectives and Relationships in New Zealand’s 2010 Defence White 
Paper’, in Security Challenges, Vol.7(1), 2011, p.14; and W. Mapp, ‘Launch of the Defence White 
Paper 2010’, 2010, viewed on 11 December 2011, http://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/launch-
defence-white-paper-2010. 
189 Ayson, ibid.p.15. 
190 Mapp, op.cit. 
 61
New Zealand no longer enjoys, if it ever did, a benign strategic 
environment.”191  
 
In a critical sense though, it was Dr Mapp’s recognition that for the 
security of New Zealand and New Zealanders to have any sense of relevance, 
meaning and efficacy, the nation must be “honest and realistic about the world 
we live in, and the priorities we have as a nation.”192 Such a proclamation 
proffered hope for a policy that would be bold, visionary and innovative, while 
accurately and pragmatically reflecting and responding to today’s security 
environment, settings and challenges. Importantly, it was a policy that needed 
to reflect traditional geostrategic and interstate imperatives – which had not 
diminished, and had, in some instances intensified – whilst also 
accommodating the array of contemporary and non-traditional security issues 
confronting New Zealand in the era of the globalisation and bifurcation of 
security. Indeed, Defence White Paper 2010 presented New Zealand with the 
ideal and necessary opportunity to reassess and challenge many prevailing 
strategic preconceptions, and in doing so, realise fundamental reform through 
the principal adoption of a more critically informed and comprehensive 
approach to security – an approach that was more focussed, broader and 
deeper in its perspectives, and which recognised the evolving dialectic existing 
between state and critical/human security conceptions.   
 
I will argue however, that the core policy likely to shape New Zealand’s 
security and defence over the next twenty-five years, missed this crucial 
imperative to critically address and affirm what security realistically means – 
or should mean – for New Zealanders and universal Humanity in the complex 
era of security globalisation and bifurcation. Rather, Defence White Paper 2010 
appears somewhat revisionary in relation to its core themes and foundational 
assumptions.  This policy (re)frames the notion security firmly within the neo-
realist tradition: conceived as a possession of the state, and quantified in terms 
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of material power maintained for the focal purposes of preserving New 
Zealand sovereignty and territorial integrity, safeguarding the institutions of 
state, while maximising state autonomy and influence.193 Correspondingly, this 
White Paper suffers from being very much another case of ‘Back to the Future’ 
security policy formulation and practice. That this is a weakness in New 
Zealand’s security approach should not surprise however, for as Evans and 
Kilcullen have noted, this is a core vulnerability common to many of the 
policy’s international contemporaries – security approaches that have informed 
the development of Defence White Paper 2010.194 These limitations are 
particularly evident in terms of the policy’s steadfast and dogmatic adherence 
to the imposition of a traditional geo-strategic focus, predicated upon 
maintaining a “safe and secure New Zealand, including its border and 
approaches”195; and its emphasis on militarised – rather than comprehensive – 
solutions in responding to somewhat esoteric and “highly unlikely … direct 
threat[s] to [New Zealand’s] territory or seas by a hostile state.”196  Indeed, 
Defence White Paper 2010 talks explicitly in terms of national – and international – 
values, abiding interests and securities, and in doing so, reinforces the status of 
the state as the fundamental and naturalised referent object of Wellington’s 
security narratives.197  
 
From a critical perspective, New Zealand’s declared security approach 
and policy assertions reinforce traditional (neo-realist) status quo thinking and 
notions that are shaped by politicised power processes which exploit 
competing discourses of identity, values, interests and threats.198 In applying 
traditional security considerations that buttresses state-centrism and the 
authority of the state, such an approach often comes at the expense of 
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individual and collective-social identities and liberties, and appear contra to 
principles that underpin universal values and freedoms. Consequently, this 
threatens the relegation of human security perspectives – the ‘people’, and their 
aspirations, needs and fears – to positions comparative inconsequence in terms 
of security policy and practice.  
 
In defining security in exclusively statist terms, (underscored by New 
Zealand’s political and economic stability, territorial integrity, and the pre-
eminence of “a rules-based international order which respects national 
sovereignty”199), Defence White Paper 2010 accords no reference to, or 
accommodation of critical and human security imperatives, and is – in part – 
unreflective of today’s globalised and bifurcated security environment and 
dynamics. In doing so, New Zealand’s security approach risks its legitimacy 
and enduring relevance by continuing to distinguish ambiguous threats and 
binary orientations for ‘belonging’ upon notions of identity. Indeed, one of the 
most striking characteristics – and inherent risks – of Defence White Paper 2010 is 
the persistence of difference and the “continuing centrality of notions of ‘we 
and they’ in the construction of identity, values, interests, norms and hence 
[security].”200 Within New Zealand’s security settings, this risk becomes 
particularly evident in four key ways: through Defence White Paper 2010’s 
reductionist patenting of ‘referent others’, in seeking to counter the effusive 
challenges posed by enigmatic ‘weak and unstable states and terrorism’, and 
‘unseen risks’201; when such propositions are officially buttressed within policy 
statements from across New Zealand’s security community202; when 
considered in respect to New Zealand’s on-going and externalist support for, 
and prosecution of the ‘Global War of Terror’ principally in Afghanistan; and 
notably, in respect to the strengthening of New Zealand domestic counter 
terrorism legislation that was subsequently employed to legally authorise, and 
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politically legitimise and justify the contentious “Operation 8” raids of 15 
October 2007.203  These examples are reflective of classic traditional security 
approaches that seek to manipulate and correlate representations of identity 
and threat as a political tactic and/or political end; and which – in extreme 
circumstances – have often been exploited to “legitimate violent or repressive 
policies, fuel conflict, [and have] lead to a misjudgement of threats and a 
distortion of policy.”204  
 
In a critical sense, the adoption of such a conventionally exclusivist, 
narrow, reductionist and externalist approach to New Zealand’s security 
paradoxically risks perpetuating human and state insecurities in both domestic 
and international contexts. Defence White Paper 2010 continues the tradition of 
emphasising the pre-eminence and utility of hard (political, military, economic 
and diplomatic) power at the expense of critically understanding and 
comprehensively addressing today’s complex security dynamics and 
dilemmas. Indeed, the ‘end game’ for Defence White Paper 2010 is about 
survival, and conditions of identity and existence. In this respect, security is 
primarily about the fate of human collectives and only secondarily about the 
personal security of individual human beings. In the prevailing system 
therefore, the standard unit of security is thus the sovereign and politicised 
territorial state.205 Consequently, this focus often comes at the sacrifice of 
critical and human security consideration, and threatens the further erosion of 
‘security’ for New Zealanders and humankind. Resultantly, in the complex 
post-9/11 security era, New Zealander’s could be required to critically “rethink 
their understanding of liberty in a democracy,”206 particularly given that we 
have already witnessed forfeitures of basic human rights and liberties 
throughout the world in the name of ‘security.’  
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Identity: whose security and the Security Referent 
Perhaps existing as the most salient security challenge for New Zealand 
today, is the identification of the most appropriate referent of and for security; 
for without a referent, there can be “no discussion of security because the 
concept is meaningless without something to secure.”207 As the Case Study 
demonstrates, traditional and prevailing approaches posit that the state is the 
most appropriate embodiment of the security referent. Such contentions are 
reinforced by the statist international system itself through ‘its’ consistent 
assertion of the primacy and efficacy of “nation-states as the most important 
strategic actors.”208 However, in an ever globalising world, security can no 
longer be tied exclusively to states or state sovereignty. Anything that makes a 
citizen feel insecure (anything that increases personal insecurity) must now be 
taken into account by governments.  
 
Today, most pressing threats to individuals arise from the fact that people 
find themselves embedded and coexisting in an ever integrated and 
interdependent environment which generates complex and unavoidable social 
and political pressures. Consequently, the processes of globalisation and 
bifurcation generally, have increased the significance of individuals as objects – 
referents – of security; and the international system and states are increasingly 
evaluated by their capacity to provide protection to individuals and 
humankind.209  
 
Such contrasting approaches, and the respective meanings ascribed to 
traditional and non-traditional approaches to security, have emerged from 
politically and intellectually prior accounts and often polarising contentions as 
they relate to ‘who’ and/or ‘what’ is to be secured. These contentions, while 
acknowledging the relationship between state and human securities, 
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unnecessarily establish each approach as inimical. However, normative scope 
does exist for the critical establishment of a via media between state and 
human security. Doing so is to discard prevailing dichotomies, and 
conceptually and empirically recognise the evolving dialectic emerging 
between these two conceptions that is producing new thinking about security 
within its contemporary settings.210  
 
The dialectic is between two referent objects – the state and people – 
wherein these two ‘organisms’ assume the status of moral and political 
equivalency and indivisibility. It recognises that “although security is the 
objective of individuals, it can only be achieved through a collective political 
process.”211 Correspondingly, it acknowledges that “the state must serve and 
support the people from which it draws its legitimacy.”212  Importantly, 
recognition of the dialectic does not seek the radical or wholesale 
transformation of security, but rather – through the processes of conceptual 
‘focussing, deepening and broadening’ – make sense of the more complex 
realities of the contemporary security environment and its various contexts. In 
doing so, it is hoped that this will contribute to a critical evolution in New 
Zealand’s understanding of, and approach to, security. This will be realised by 
seeking to promote a comprehensive approach that conceives security as an 
instrumental value that promotes a more inclusive and integrative humanity; 
and that correspondingly refocuses New Zealand’s security elites from their 
almost exclusive focus and continuing preoccupation with nationalist identity 
and statist orthodoxies which promote the idea of security against others.213     
     
Critical inception: Evolving the dialectic between State and Human-centric 
Securities in New Zealand   
The globalisation and bifurcation of security is testimony to “our living in 
a world more interdependent than ever before. All societies depend much more 
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on the acts or omissions of others for … [their] security and even for their 
survival.”214 Correspondingly, as Behm has recognised, as “the 21st century 
unfolds, and as new problems … begin to impact on the security planning of 
nations, the need for a clearer articulation of the relationship between [critical 
and] human security concerns and strategy will become more pressing.”215  
 
Achieving a critically informed understanding and accord that ‘bridges’ 
apparent theoretical, conceptual and practical divides must become a focal 
priority of political and security elites alike. Yet, while normative 
transformations in security such ‘Sovereignty as Responsibility’ and 
‘Responsibility to Protect’ are a welcome trend in this direction, I will 
demonstrate that continued dissonance, and intransigence toward change must 
be overcome if we are to achieve enduring sector reforms. Failure to do so risks 
the development of sub-optimal security theory and concept. This in turn, can 
lead to the establishment of limited and limiting policy, programs and 
practices. Ultimately and of greatest concern though, any unwillingness or 
failure to reform threatens to directly perpetuate and exacerbate state, societal 
and individual insecurity.    
 
Overcoming the apparent binary distinctions between state and human 
securities is to ontologically understand that politicised – structural and 
philosophical – distinctions between the ‘state’ and ‘society’ are inherently 
ambiguous, and increasingly discordant with contemporary realities. Indeed, 
as Buzan recognised both the state and society should be considered as 
 
 “sentient, self-regarding, behavioural units with definable physical attributes. Both 
exist in a social environment with units of the same type, and therefore face similar sets 
of problems in working out satisfactory conditions for coexistence. And both share a 
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human essence, the individual by definition, and the state because it is composed of, and 
run by, individuals.”216
  
Understanding this, particularly in the (re)construction of security regimes, is 
to recognise – normatively speaking – that the state and society are mutually 
constitutive elements. Modern states moreover, are penetrated by and 
integrated into multiple overlapping networks that extend into society within 
and beyond geospatial boundaries. Subsequently, attempts “to treat security as 
if it were confined to any single level or any single sector invite serious 
distortions of understanding.”217  
 
In this crucial respect, the concept of security connects the state and 
society, the ‘international’ and ‘global’, and the ‘individual’ and universal 
Humanity so closely that it demands an integrative perspective.218  Indeed, we 
are witnessing the first tentative – but welcome – steps to critically understand 
and explain the nature of these dynamics within New Zealand’s security 
contexts, wherein ‘National security’ is increasingly being viewed as the 
fundamental “condition which permits the citizens of a state to go about their 
daily business free from fear and able to make the most of opportunities to 
advance their way of life.”219 Yet, from this perspective, Defence White Paper 
2010’s almost myopic focus upon and reinforcement of prevailing state-centric 
approaches – which conceives the security of the state as an end in itself – 
appears paradoxical and problematic in philosophical, policy and practical 
terms. The continuing prevalence of the traditional approach adopted by New 
Zealand’s government in the form of Defence White Paper 2010 appears 
symptomatic of an emerging conceptual delta in New Zealand’s evolving 
approach to security, and of the institutional dissonance between the Ministries 
of state responsible for “National Security.”              
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 Overcoming many of these conceptual and structural limitations in New 
Zealand’s approach to security, can be addressed through the evolution of a 
normative and utilitarian dialectic and via media between state and critical-
human security ideas, concepts and practices. In principle, the notion of a 
congruent dialectic between state and human-centric imperatives provides a 
promising means of developing the security agenda in ways that more 
effectively address the diverse array of challenges and opportunities it 
presents.  
 
The ‘dialectic’, in these circumstances, refers the potential for evolutions in 
contemporary security thinking and practice via the means of self-reflective 
critical inquiry. Intrinsically, this analysis stands outside predefined given 
frameworks and tests the logic and legitimacy of their origins and underlying 
assumptions, and challenges the ‘truth of opinions’ of the ‘opposing social 
forces’ it is investigating (state-centric and human-centric approaches to 
security in this instance).220 In doing so, critical inquiry seeks to expose the 
inherent security problems of political and social life. It does so from a 
standpoint of critical distance, and then explores “the immanent potentialities 
in order to provide ideas and solutions that might promote emancipation … 
from oppressive situations and structures.”221 Such a potentiality – and a core 
objective of the dialectic – is the establishment of a possible new synthesis, or 
broad consensus (‘via media’) between state and human securities. Indeed, as 
Kerr observes, such an outcome could lead to the normative formulation of an 
“ideal-type” conceptualisation and practice of security that is focussed, 
broader, deeper and inclusive in its perspectives; that understands and 
responds to the respective strengths and weaknesses, virtues and flaws, and 
causal and constitutive connections between state and human securities; and 
which is comprehensive in its approach and utilitarian in its effects.   
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The development of such an “ideal-type” approach promises much in the 
way of addressing and alleviating insecurity and suffering.  Yet, the most 
effective and likely means by which to realise these ideal outcomes – the 
dialectic and via media – are under challenge. The omnipresent threat to their 
evolution is the persistence of an apparent entrenched and trenchant separation 
that continues to prevail between state-centric and critical/human-centric 
security orthodoxies. However, addressing and overcoming this threat, is to 
broadly understand and recognise that the edifice of contemporary security is a 
modern, complex, adaptive and interdependent phenomenon that transcends 
traditional social, (geo-)political, and intellectual (theoretical/conceptual) 
divides. Consequently, as Booth elucidates  
 
“The challenges faced by humans at all levels demand a more effective [approach] to 
security: our time are far too complex and the world too varied for the reductionisms, 
parsimony, simplicities, regressive implications, silences and assumptions of 
[prevailing security orthodoxies.] … The aim here is not to become overburdened by 
distant ideal structures, but to concentrate on reformist steps to make a better world 
somewhat more likely.”222  
 
Yet, in theoretical and conceptual contexts, overcoming the intransigence 
and resistance toward reforms, are not as insurmountable as one might first 
consider. Indeed the idea of an interaction, or dialectic, and common ground, 
or via media, between different security traditions is already recognised, and is 
realising increasing traction – tacitly and explicitly – within today’s security 
settings and disciplines. In this sense, Martin Wight has argued convincingly of 
the normative existence of this interaction and interdependence, wherein the 
traditions “are streams, with eddies and cross-current, sometimes interlacing 
and never for long confined to their own river bed … they influence and cross-
fertilise one another and they change without, I think, losing their inner 
identity.”223  
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The evidence to substantiate Wight’s proposition of the existence and 
need for an interactive dialectic and transcendent via media – that encompasses 
theory, concept and practice – can be found within the DNA of the traditions 
themselves. For instance, Human Security approaches tend “to be pragmatic 
about finding solutions. It challenges the primacy of the state but is willing to 
concede the reality of state power and to work within the state to find 
solutions. Indeed, human security [approaches] tend to be essentially open-
minded in a liberal sense regarding the state; it believes that the state, if 
properly constituted, can work in the interests of people.”224 In a similar vein, 
we are increasingly witnessing the use of “elastic interpretations by state 
leaders of the more traditional concept of territorial sovereignty and vital 
interests. In the real world, it seems more sensible to consider human security 
and state security as being complimentary and mutually reinforcing, rather 
than as competing concepts.”225 Consequently, Wight’s rationale of, and for the 
dialectic and via media, is representative of an increasingly recognised and on-
going need for innovation within the security field. Embracing this opportunity 
is to accede to the ultimate moralpolitikal and utilitarian viewpoint that 
“Humanity after all is indivisible … In the context of many of the challenges 
facing humanity today, the collective interest is the national interest.”226  
 
The apparent promise therefore, is that the conceptual and practical utility 
inherent in, and derived from the dialectic and via media, might then lead to 
the possibility of positive transformations within our security thinking and 
frameworks. At best, it might lead to a new normative synthesis of critical 
understanding and comprehensive cooperation between state and human-
centric approaches to security. Such an affirmation supports the contention that 
state defence and security agendas should be increasingly influenced, if not 
shaped, by normative critical-human security considerations. Accordingly, 
harmonisation of these respective agendas is required. In this sense, both 
conceptions should necessarily be considered as complementary rather than 
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incongruous. The realisation of the dialectic and via media therefore, must be 
based on the inclusive broadening of state security agendas and the correlative 
narrowing of human security approaches.  
 
Certainly, corresponding transformations in each security rubric is 
considered imperative to realising effective theoretical, conceptual 
reconciliation and thus the accrual of universal analytical and policy value 
within contemporary settings. This will then enable subsequent development 
of more effective practical response programmes that operate at the level of 
chronic insecurities. Today’s security approaches must envision 
comprehensive, integrated and inclusive solutions that remedy the array of 
complex and adaptive, traditional and emerging challenges that exist on an 
ever crowded security agenda. The realisation of this requires concerted efforts 
to develop norms, processes and institutions, which address insecurity in ways 
that are systematic not makeshift, comprehensive not compartmentalised, 
preventive not reactive. Consequently, the operation of the dialectic and via 
media between state and human securities is considered imperative to the 
development of relevant and purposive security infrastructures that strengthen 
individual and collective resilience, and which improves universal security and 
the quality of life for all.227  
 
Bridging and Boundary Paradigms 
Importantly, from both practical and conceptual perspectives, seminal 
‘bridging’ and ‘boundary’ paradigms have evolved that could be utilised to 
facilitate the state-human security dialectic and via media. Such paradigms are 
predicated upon a relational understanding in which the  
 
“state becomes, and is recognised as the mechanism by which people seek to achieve 
adequate levels of security against social threats. As the symbiosis between the state, 
society and the individual develops along more complex and productive lines, it 
necessarily leads to an interpretation of a harmonised concept of security in which the 
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state places great emphasis on values derived directly from the interests of the 
individual citizens.”228  
 
In many respects, human security has advanced in responsive measure to the 
evolution of this state-citizen relationship. This evolution also addresses a 
critical conceptual void in our critical appreciation of today’s diffuse and 
manifold security dynamics, challenges and opportunities, and in the 
analogous requirement for comprehensive approaches and responses to such. 
Consequently, the utility of human security stems from its ‘privileged’ location 
as an influential bridging paradigm between traditional state-centric and 
broader critical approaches to security.  
 
Fundamentally, human-centred approaches to security seek to impact 
people’s lives constructive and progressive ways. Yet unlike other critical 
strands – wary of co-option within prevailing security strictures and structures 
– Human Security seeks positive influence through a proactive engagement 
with state security agendas and policies. In this respect, normative ‘critical’ 
strands, which claim to seek in change the world for the better, could therefore 
employ human security as a conceptual bridge between critical and statist 
approaches to security.229  
 
As a problem-solving conception which engages with policymaking, 
Human Security provides scope for non-traditional security ideas to influence 
and gain traction within policy and practical program settings. Human 
Security, given its policy and practical relevance, can therefore serve as a 
conduit for advancing critical perspectives within prevailing security structures 
and institutions.  Importantly though, human security does so by appropriately 
interrogating state security frames, wherein the concept operates less as policy 
agenda within existing political structures and discourses, but more as a 
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necessary critique to those practices.230 Human Security’s value in this sense is 
derived directly from its uncompromised ‘shaping’ properties, and it capacity to 
demonstrate the indivisibility between sources of insecurity. In effect, human 
security links the emancipatory aspirations and needs of the individual (and 
universal Humanity) to the security of the state, and so affirms Waever’s 
proposition that state “security is influenced in important ways by dynamics at 
the level of the individual.”231  
 
Correspondingly, in the context of normatively influencing state security 
agendas, Human Security has been appropriately described as a ‘boundary 
object.’ The boundary concept remains flexible enough to be used by diverse 
parties, while robust enough to retain shared meaning across this range of 
users. It must be more than a general idea like equity or freedom; “it should 
span between ideals, life situations and actions.”232 In this sense, Human 
Security can establish its policy resonance and practical efficacy “when treated 
as an ethos rather than an agenda to be slotted into existing security paradigms. 
Used in this way, the narratives of human security are understood to have the 
potential to open discussions of security to public debates about the nature of 
policies towards foreign states and the demand that decisions are made first 
and foremost with the ‘Other’ in mind.”233
 
Conclusions 
 In 2012, against the backdrop of an era framed by the globalisation and 
bifurcation, our estimation and understanding of security stands at a 
theoretical, conceptual, and practical crossroad. Indeed, the nature of 
contemporary security is testimony to “our living in a world more 
interdependent than ever before. Individuals, societies, states and all Humanity 
depend much more on the acts or omissions of ‘others’ for their security and 
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even for their survival.”234 Under such conditions, we face crucial choices – 
individually and collectively – about the meaning(s) we ascribe to security, and 
in relation to what makes security meaningful. As a fundamental basis for 
consideration, this requires us to understand that “security is a legitimate quest 
for all;”235 and that the provision of sustainable security would appear to 
require approaches that critically challenge, co-exist with, and – where 
necessary – go beyond prevailing realist-inspired discourses. In this sense, one 
could rightly assume that such choice would proffer hope for bold, innovative 
and critical thinking about the continued relevance, utility and legitimacy of 
our current approaches to security. Certainly, while the pervasive aspects of 
globalisation and bifurcation have generated more intensive questioning about 
contemporary security – in light of the Human tragedies in Africa and the 
Balkans throughout the 1990s, and particularly in the wake of the September 11 
attacks – it is apparent that traditional statist approaches continue to prevail 
and shape mainstream academic, political and policy interpretations of today’s 
security dynamics.236   
 
 In acknowledging that the continuing primacy of the state in world affairs 
seems a firm reality for the foreseeable future, and appreciating that the state 
will remain the principle agent for addressing insecurity, this thesis 
understands that traditional conceptions of state security are a necessary – but 
not wholly sufficient – condition of human welfare within today’s settings.237 
Indeed, since the end of the Cold War there has been a “growing unease with 
the traditional concept of security, which privileges the state and emphasises 
material power.”238 In this respect, it is increasing recognised that the security 
challenges of the 21st Century are, in many respects, broader in scope, range 
and consequence, and more complex than the traditional state and 
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international security institutions and policies designed to address them. In this 
profoundly changing environment therefore, the requirement to rethink 
politics and power, and specifically the purpose and role of what might be 
called ‘state security’, has become both necessary and unavoidable.   
 
Yet, while security is increasingly viewed as a universally indivisible 
objective for all, the state – as the dominant unit of order and organisation – 
continues to occupy the privileged site as the natural focus of security. In this 
respect, security’s eminent concern is with state sovereignty, centrality and 
survival; and the maximisation of security through strategic pursuit of national 
interests that consolidates power at the level of the state. The New Zealand 
approach to security – as articulated in the Defence White Paper 2010 – is 
reflective of the persistence of state-centrism, and symptomatic of this form of 
consolidation. However, as I have demonstrated, the most inherent risk of such 
a narrow and reductionist consolidation, is its potential to perpetuate and 
exacerbate insecurity and suffering through the marginalisation, exclusion or 
subjugation of individuals, communities, and/or universal ‘freedoms’ in 
deference to the state. In such instances – and in its most extreme and 
repressive of forms – this consolidation threatens to perpetuate the paradoxical 
condition by which the state becomes the focal cause of insecurity, rather than 
the primary source of security. As a consequence, state-centric security 
approaches are proving increasingly limited, limiting, ineffectual and 
discordant with the security realities of today.    
 
 Addressing these limitations, and the resulting void in our contemporary 
security thinking and practice, must therefore be a focal objective in any 
reconceptualisation of security. In doing so, we must seek to overcome the 
corrosive impacts that materialise with the persistence of objectively narrow 
and static statist approaches that are at once reductionist, and have imposed 
just one image of a state-centric, geo-strategically framed reality. Achieving 
more positive, openly subjective and inclusive outcomes in this sense, can be 
realised through the integration of more critical, human-centric perspectives 
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and approaches that normatively progress our consideration and 
understanding of security and insecurity.  
 
As I have argued, understanding and addressing (in)security within 
contemporary settings, requires us to critically focus, broaden and deepen our 
perspectives. Indeed, in the “strategic action undertaken to bring about change, 
there is no sounder basis than immanent critique to discover the latent potentials 
in situations on which to build political and social progress.”239 To this end, 
Critical approaches to security, such as Human Security – through processes of 
political and social emancipation – are committed to understanding and 
resolving the (in)security of real people in real places. Such approaches do so 
through the means of ‘critique’, which entails the exploration of what is ‘real’, 
and what is reliable knowledge. In applying critique, Critical approaches stand 
outside the given frameworks and units of analysis they are exploring, and 
engage with concrete social and political issues, with the aim of maximising 
and optimising opportunities for enhancing security, community and 
emancipation, at all levels of existence, and in the interests of universal 
Humanity. In this sense, as agents of structural, social and political 
emancipation, Critical approaches derive much of their value and utility by 
drawing on a progressive and inclusive agenda that is at once broader, deeper 
and more focussed than state-centric security conceptions.  
 
The potency of Critical approaches such as Human Security stems from 
the ability to illuminate those threat and vulnerability concerns which 
transcend geopolitical borders, and structural, material notions of state power 
and interest. The argument here is that human security narratives not only 
provide space for the inclusion of a wider range of issues, [but they] allow us to 
focus on issues that have been occluded by previous state-centric security 
practices.240 Importantly though, unlike other critical conceptions, Human 
Security does so by neither delegitimizing nor devaluing the state without due 
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cause or justification. Rather, the critical utility of Human Security is derived 
from situating the state in contemporary settings where its relative value and 
relevance as a security referent and agent can be more accurately assessed and 
optimised.  
 
In broader settings, the relevance Human Security lies in its exploration of 
the network of connections and contradictions between personal security and 
the security of the state. The state is a major source of both threats to and 
security for individuals. Individuals provide much of the reason for, and some 
of the limits to, the security-seeking activities of the state. This leads directly to 
questions about the basic nature of the state, and the relationship between 
states, their citizens, and individuals.241 Critically speaking, in understanding 
the constitutive and causal dynamics of this relationship, Human Security 
seeks to sanctify the individual – or people collectively – as a legitimate referent 
of security in a mutually constitutive relationship with the state. However, for 
such a relationship to exist necessarily implies the state – when its instruments 
of power are applied in comprehensive, cooperative, moral, ethical and 
humane ways – can and should remain the most effective guarantors of human 
security.   
  
 In many respects, the increasing recognition of the existence of this 
normative state-citizen (human) security compact, is reflective of the 
emergence of a utilitarian dialectic and via media between state-centric and 
human-centric security approaches which have been cast as hitherto inimical. 
The dialectic is between two referent objects – the state and people – wherein 
these two ‘organisms’ assume the status moral and political equivalency and 
indivisibility. It recognises that although security is the objective of individuals, 
it can only be achieved through collective political and social processes. 
Correspondingly, it acknowledges that the state – and state sovereignty – must 
serve and support the people from which it draws its legitimacy. The apparent 
promise therefore, is that the conceptual and practical utility inherent in, and 
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derived from the notions of dialectic and via media, might then lead to positive 
transformations within our security thinking and frameworks. At best, it might 
result in a new normative synthesis of critical understanding and 
comprehensive cooperation between state and human approaches to security 
through the establishment of a dynamic via media that adjusts subject to the 
relative security context or need.  
 
Such affirmations support the contention that state defence and security 
agendas should be increasingly influenced, if not shaped, by critical 
perspectives and human security considerations. Accordingly, harmonisation 
of these respective agendas is required. To this end, from both practical and 
conceptual perspectives, seminal ‘bridging’ and ‘boundary’ paradigms could 
be utilised to facilitate an integration, or cooperation between, state and human 
securities. Indeed, as I have demonstrated, the situation of human security, as a 
‘pluralising’ bridging and boundary concept fulfils a furtive but tactile 
significance. Human security represents a normative and utilitarian step 
towards the potential realisation of a comprehensive security compact that 
conceptually reconciles, practically integrates and philosophically recognises 
an ‘ideal-type’ duality of state and individual. Importantly, in doing so, it is 
hoped that security conceived in such a way, will contribute to a critical 
evolution in New Zealand’s understanding of, and approach to, security. This 
will be realised by seeking to promote a truly comprehensive – national – 
approach that conceives security as an instrumental value which promotes a 
more inclusive and integrative humanity; and that correspondingly refocuses 
New Zealand’s security elites from their almost exclusive focus and continuing 
preoccupation with state-centric orthodoxies which promote the somewhat 
binary idea of security against others. This objective will form the basis for 
exploration and discussion in Chapter Three of this Thesis.    
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Chapter 3: TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO SECURITY  
 
Introduction 
 Because the condition of security is of such importance to ‘All’ – because it 
is primordial and deeply politicised – to have something labelled security is to 
give it priority on the agenda. Security, above all, is a powerful social and 
political concept; it is the sort of word that energises opinion and moves 
material power.242 Yet, as this Thesis has highlighted, it is becoming increasing 
acknowledged that the global strategic contours are shifting, and the mosaic of 
security challenges confronting the 21st Century are broader, more complex, 
and interdependent than the prevailing – national and international – security 
frameworks and institutions designed to manage them. Multi-dimensional and 
interconnected, these non-traditional security issues are moving from the 
periphery to the centre of security concerns of both states and individuals. 
Collectively, and concordant with the persistence of traditional strategic 
threats, they represent the emergence of a new security agenda that has the 
capacity to challenge the security of states and human survival in ways that 
will demand the renewed attention of security elites and policymakers 
everywhere.243 To this end, as United States Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton 
observed 
 
“To meet these 21st Century challenges, we need to use new tools, the new 21st Century 
statecraft. And we’ve begun to do that. We have seen the possibilities of what can 
happen when ordinary citizens are empowered.”244
 
Indeed, as I have demonstrated, the key conclusion to be drawn from my 
analysis of the limitations of prevailing statist security approaches is that a 
more comprehensive concept of security is required. As I have argued, such a 
concept should be normatively informed by critical – focussed, broader deeper, 
and inclusive – perspectives, and could utilise Human Security as a ‘bridge’ to, 
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and means of gaining traction within ‘real world’ policy circles. Such an option, 
I believe, must be pragmatically considered by proponents of a critical 
approach, particularly if we are to accept their claims of being committed to 
understanding and resolving the (in)security real people in real places by 
engaging “with concrete issues in world politics, with the aim of maximising 
opportunities for enhancing security, community, and emancipation in the 
human interest.”245 With this in mind, such a concept must understand and 
acknowledge that the security of the state and international system is both 
complimentary to, and coterminous with that of the individual and universal 
Humanity. Importantly this requires a form of philosophical and theoretical 
harmony, and conceptual and practical accord between critical and human 
security approaches, and prevailing state-centric security approaches. To do so 
is to recognise that these non-traditional and state security approaches are 
complimentary and mutually reinforcing, and have the capacity to “strengthen 
the institutional policies that link individuals and the state – and the state with 
a global world.”246  
 
While recognising that the existing (inter)national security system is not 
optimally designed to prevent and deal effectively with new types of security 
threats, overcoming these limitations necessarily require the understanding 
that ‘weak’ institutions are a common factor in explaining repeated cycles of 
insecurity and violence. In this respect, given our moral obligation to others, 
and our ‘enlightened’ self-interests – and those of states – we need to establish 
new frameworks that allow us to meet our responsibilities to others in today’s 
interdependent world, while also being able to deal with an increasingly 
heterogeneous security environment.247
 
To this end, at institutional, policy and operational levels, it is increasingly 
understood that a modern comprehensive approach, that integrates all sectors 
of an ever evolving security community, will be fundamental to addressing 
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both contemporary and future security challenges. Indeed, transforming and 
building frameworks and institutions that provide comprehensive, universal 
security and justice is considered essential to breaking cycles of state and 
human insecurity, and to restoring, ensuring and sustaining the confidence of 
populations.248 In this respect, Buzan is correct in his dialectical assessment that   
 
“some sense can be made of individual, [state] and international security, and of 
[human], military, political, societal, economic and environmental security as ideas in 
their own right. But a full [and comprehensive] understanding of each can only be 
gained if it is related to the others. Attempts to treat security as if it was confined to 
any single level or any single sector invite serious distortions of understanding.”249
   
In a crucial development in this direction, the utility of a comprehensive 
approach is being intrinsically linked to a critically influenced security 
understanding of the policy and operational need for an emphasis on the 
‘human dimension’ within national security considerations.250 Consequently, in 
seeking to address today’s security agenda, states such as New Zealand are 
coming to acknowledge – in both tactic and explicit terms – that their current 
national security architectures and systems are limited in design, and 
increasingly misaligned with dynamic and rapidly changing global and 
national security environments.251  
 
 In acknowledging the limitations of its existing structures, and in seeking 
to reform its contemporary approach to security, New Zealand has taken this 
first crucial and profound step forward and towards “magnifying the national 
security effort; [wherein] work on developing a comprehensive national 
security framework, led by the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, is 
already underway.”252 To date, this resulted in the issuing of New Zealand’s 
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first comprehensive appraisal of, and statement on ‘National Security’ in the 
form of New Zealand’s National Security System. Importantly, this publication 
has the potential to be viewed as normative progress towards the 
accommodation – and possible formal recognition – of the state-human security 
dialectic and via media. In this sense, it is hoped that New Zealand’s National 
Security System can be viewed as an opportunity to ‘open space’ for the 
consideration of critical, and more particularly, human security perspectives 
within the nation’s security policy and academic settings. Such an 
accommodation could lead to the eventual establishment of a National Security 
Strategy, and the development of a truly comprehensive Approach to Security 
that is normatively informed and complimented by critical and human security 
imperatives. Yet, while such advancements have been important and positive, I 
will contend that any enduring utility derived from these reforms, risks being 
undermined by the persistence of increasingly dissonant and discordant 
institutional influences seemingly resistant to such change.  
 
As my Thesis has demonstrated throughout, obstacles to developing 
open, integrated and inclusive comprehensive approaches to security are, “in 
the first instance, conceptual and revolve around contested definitional 
parameters and ambiguous relationships between theory and practice.”253 In 
this respect, despite an increasing practical pragmatism in security 
programmatic and operational senses, New Zealand’s state-centric strategic 
doctrine, policy and culture have been slow and dogmatically resistant in 
adjusting to the challenges of a new bifurcated and globalised security 
environment. Indeed, in a contemporary security sense, the disjunction 
between New Zealand’s strategic rationale and institutional frameworks, and 
security practice have become sharp, creating what can be styled a ‘Tyranny of 
Dissonance.’  
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Understanding and addressing this sense of dissonance has been a core 
theme and focal objective of this Thesis. The character of today’s globalised and 
bifurcated security environment is too expansive and complex for mastery by 
any single Ministry of State. The combination of ‘global social’ networks 
“challenge not simply the traditional defence of the state, but increasingly the 
security of society and its citizens.”254 This deeper reality has led observers 
such as Behm, Fruhling, Korski, Brenchly and Forrest to recognise the inherent 
need for reform within prevailing security approaches and institutions.255 I 
argue that such reform should occur in ways that are comprehensive in nature; 
open, inclusive and integrated in practice; normative and utilitarian in effect 
and outcome; and underwritten by a conception that is focussed, broader and 
deeper in its perspectives. As this Chapter will establish, coherently and 
cohesively reconceptualising security in this way, for use in a New Zealand 
milieu, can be accomplished around the central notion of advancing the social 
compact between the state, society, and the citizen; while accommodating the 
vulnerabilities of the state, the individual, and encompassing Humanity.                  
  
A New Security Agenda: New Zealand’s National Security System  
 In April 2011, the New Zealand Government – through the medium of 
New Zealand’s National Security System (NSS) – committed itself to a 
reconceptualisation of the nation’s contemporary approach to security. The 
NSS establishes, for the first time, a comprehensive view of New Zealand’s 
security; and frames a “comprehensive concept of national security.”256 In 
doing so, the NSS has – somewhat tacitly – established a normative basis that 
that could eventually lead to a formal recognition of human security 
imperatives, the existence of the state-human security dialectic, and the 
corresponding realisation of a more open, inclusive and balanced accord (via 
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media) within New Zealand’s security policy settings. The NSS does so by 
defining New Zealand’s national security as 
 
“the condition which permits the citizens of a state to go about their daily business 
confidently free from fear and able to make the most of opportunities to advance their 
way of life …National security goals should be pursued in an accountable way, which 
meets the Government’s responsibility to protect New Zealand, its people, and its 
interests, while respecting civil liberties and the rule of law.”257  
  
Such a transformation within New Zealand’s security understanding must 
be considered a crucial development and breakthrough opportunity for 
increasing the consideration of critical, and particularly, human security 
imperatives. Indeed, the above statement is reflective of the human security 
proposition of ‘Sovereignty as Responsibility’, wherein human security and 
state security are mutually constitutive, for a “state that protects its citizens and 
respects their rights is ultimately one that enjoys legitimacy and support.”258  In 
doing so, New Zealand’s adoption of the comprehensive concept of national 
security has necessarily (re)established the compact between state and citizen. 
Resultantly, it has also, somewhat unintentionally, critically ‘focussed’ and 
elevated human security imperatives – “New Zealanders”: their needs and 
aspirations, vulnerabilities and fears – to a status of comparative consequence 
in the state’s thinking. In this respect and in a normative sense, the NSS can be 
viewed as recognising the fundamental importance of “all activities in the 
national security arena [being] examined for their collective effects on core 
values – justice, freedom, legitimate and accountable government, the rule of 
law, tolerance, opportunity for all, and human rights.”259 Such an approach 
represent both an important break from exclusive state-centric calculations like 
those which persist in Defence White Paper 2010; while increasingly opening our 
eyes to the all-too-real security issues of people.  
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Yet, while New Zealand’s steps to reconceptualise security represents 
quantum normative progress, one can argue in a critical sense, that it remains 
somewhat limited and limiting by its failure to address the utilitarian 
imperatives of universal Humanity. It does so in ways fail to fully appreciate 
the dynamics of the globalisation and bifurcation of security; that frames 
human security as an instrumentally exclusive condition reserved for the 
recognised ‘citizens of a state’; and which reinforces binary distinctions 
between human beings and the notion of ‘other’ as discussed in Chapter 2 of 
this Thesis. In order to realise a truly open and inclusive conception of security, 
redressing such fundamental limitations within the NSS is essential. Indeed, 
such an outcome could be achieved wherein human security considerations 
should be explicitly acknowledged and explained as an integrated, and 
integrative, element of New Zealand’s comprehensive approach to national 
security. To this end, the formulation of a National Security Strategy for New 
Zealand that is more critically focussed, broader and deeper in it perspectives, 
accords such an opportunity. In doing so, to realise any sense of enduring 
relevance, utility and legitimacy, this strategy must allow New Zealand to meet 
its moral obligations and responsibilities to others in today’s interdependent 
world, and must necessarily include “positions about fundamentally universal 
principles and common values.”260  
 
As Chapter 1 explained, our era is destined to be marked by complexity 
and deep change. Indeed major social change, underwritten by people’s desire 
to participate in processes that shape their lives, is accelerating at a rate fast 
enough to challenge the adaptive capacities of most state polities and 
societies.261 Consequently, under such conditions it is becoming increasingly 
“dangerous to make policy in the short term or to arbitrarily diminish the 
universe of possibilities by ideologically limiting policy choices.”262 
Increasingly, New Zealand is recognising that today’s challenges are complex 
and crosscutting: simultaneously engaging social, political and security 
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systems in ways which “inevitably has the effect of eroding the customary 
boundaries that differentiate bureaucratic concepts and missions that are based 
on them.”263               
 
In the adoption of a comprehensive concept and approach as its security 
leit-motif, New Zealand has purposefully sought to broaden security beyond its 
traditional emphasis of “protecting the State against military threats or political 
violence.”264 As the NSS describes, New Zealand is transitioning to an idea of 
security that transcends purely physical, material and power-oriented 
dimensions. As the NSS recognises 
 
“National security policies were traditionally focused on protecting the State against 
military threats or political violence. While responding to such threats remains a 
fundamental responsibility of government, modern concepts of national security 
manage civil contingencies and societal risks alongside these traditional priorities. 
[Importantly, the NSS understands] that the risks faced by modern societies extend 
well beyond national borders.”265
 
In this sense the release of the NSS is representative of New Zealand entering 
“the ‘broadening and deepening’ phase of conceptualising security.”266 Today, 
in the practical construction and application of its comprehensive concept, New 
Zealand identifies and understands its security challenges – and those 
confronting New Zealanders and common Humanity - on a broader and 
deeper “’riskscape’ … [and] ‘all-hazards’ basis.”267  
 
As I have demonstrated, the contemporary security environment has been 
routinely defined as uncertain, complex and proliferated with 
multidimensional, interdependent security risks. ‘Risk’ in this context, as 
Ritchie explains,  
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“can be defined as a product of the integration of [people], states and societies into 
globalised economic, social, military and political processes and relationships, and the 
ensuing vulnerability to system changes and shocks. Vulnerability generates risk, 
which fosters insecurity.”268         
 
Such an appreciation is shaping New Zealand’s deeper understanding of 
the contemporary riskscape. In New Zealand’s case, the notion of security now 
seeks to address “a mix of traditional and newly emerging risks [in which …] a 
number of new vectors of harm are emerging that have the potential to affect 
security at the personal as well as state level.”269 Under such conditions, New 
Zealand citizens can be considered enmeshed within interdependent global-
social networks of opportunity and vulnerability, which have the correlative 
capacity to generate security and insecurity across multiple indices of state and 
human security.270 In effectively confronting the challenges the contemporary 
riskscape presents, while maximising opportunities to enhance state and 
human security and resilience, New Zealand has recognised that its security 
institutions and practices need to change. 
 
  As the Human Development Report 2011 attests, ‘weak’ institutions are a 
common factor in explaining repeated cycles of insecurity and violence.271 
Transforming and building strong and legitimate institutions that provide 
security and justice for ‘All’ is therefore central to breaking cycles of insecurity; 
and to restoring, ensuring, and sustaining the confidence and trust of 
populations.  This requires all states to continually re-evaluate their security 
institutions to ensure their operations are effectively – legally and morally – 
ensuring state and individual security. In this respect, New Zealand’s adoption 
of an expanded “approach to risk identification and risk response, [and the 
development of] a more open and transparent national security 
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architecture”272, is normatively representative of such utilitarian and 
transformational change. Indeed, fostering a contemporary culture of 
institutional ‘openness’ and ‘transparency’, will serve to support the emergence 
of a New Zealand state-human security dialectic; while contributing to the 
evolution of ‘stronger’ and perceptibly more legitimate institutions that are 
capable of effective addressing today’s security challenges.   
 
Correspondingly, in seeking to address state and human insecurity in 
practically meaningful and worthwhile ways, the NSS somewhat tacitly 
recognises that the New Zealand state and society must now necessarily 
comprise a reformed national security community. Importantly, it must be a 
community that operates “in an integrated and networked [manner, and] 
works together to manage and respond to national security issues.”273 To this 
end, the NSS has the capacity to serve as the conceptual and practical catalyst 
for both reconciling the state with its citizens, and binding the detailed and 
diverse operations of New Zealand’s security institutions into a coherent, 
coordinated and integrated network. In this respect, the NSS contributing to the 
realisation of a more comprehensive, and ‘focussed, broader deeper, and 
inclusive’ appreciation of New Zealand’s security than ever before.  In doing so 
it further affirms the utility of the state-human security dialectic and via media 
by recognising that New Zealand’s “capacity to deal with the full range of 
national security challenges requires the system to be integrated, [and] able to 
leverage partnerships between government agencies … and individuals.”274  
     
The Tyranny of Dissonance 
For New Zealand, addressing the type of complex security conditions 
outlined in Chapter 1, does not lend itself to the single-dimensioned strategic 
approaches that are characteristic of the traditional state-centric security 
paradigm. Yet, although more ‘comprehensive’ – and critically attuned – ideas 
are increasingly influencing New Zealand’s contemporary conception of 
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security, there is explicit recognition that some of the nation’s security 
“institutions and practices have remained compartmentalised or narrowly 
focussed.”275 While there have been centralised efforts to transition New 
Zealand to a comprehensive approach to security, and in doing so establish a 
truly integrated and cohesive ‘Security System’, overcoming apparent and 
persistent cultural, conceptual and operational dissonance within and between 
the nation’s security agencies remains a somewhat aspirational reform 
objective.         
 
As Lasswell presciently observed in 1950, there “are no experts in national 
security, there are only experts in aspects of the problem.”276 In responding to 
the security challenges of today, it is becoming increasingly recognised 
therefore that effective statecraft – Clinton’s normative notion of “new 21st 
Century statecraft” – should be based upon the comprehensive and utilitarian 
interplay of all sources of legitimate national power. To this end, Kilcullen 
argues that patterns of statecraft are shaped by a nation’s strategic culture, 
which drives national strategy, national approaches to security and policy 
pragmatism. However, like other forms of culture, strategic culture changes 
slowly, if at all. Therefore, even a perfect security approach, and policy such as 
the NSS, is likely to fail if it is incongruous with New Zealand’s strategic 
culture, and the – often entrenched – processes of national statecraft.277 In this 
respect, particularly at the institutional level, this sense of cultural, conceptual 
and practical dissonance continues to pervade New Zealand’s contemporary 
security system.    
 
The release of the NSS, clearly defines the parameters of New Zealand’s 
comprehensive approach security, and the corresponding requirement for an 
integrated national security community that engages all elements of both the 
state and society, and at all levels. In doing so, the NSS has sought to realise the 
somewhat normative and utilitarian establishment of a cohesive and truly 
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national security culture. Yet problematically, the notion of a unified ‘national 
security culture’ remains, as yet, undefined and unquantifiable – and 
potentially unattainable given the persistence of somewhat fragmented and 
often compartmentalised relationships between New Zealand’s security 
institutions. Indeed, as Ungerer highlights, within emerging national 
communities “it may be possible to identify loose affiliations across 
government … but these sub-cultural groupings don’t often talk to each other. 
Sometimes, they are in direct disagreement. None could be said to be fully 
cohesive, in the sense of working towards a shared purpose or goal.”278 Within 
New Zealand’s security community Burnett affirms this view where he 
considers the delivery of security outcomes is achieved predominantly by the 
actions of agencies operating independently without a common strategic 
security context, and without a central decision-making authority for directing 
the delivery of the national security agenda. Burnett goes further by contending 
that New Zealand’s view of, and approach to security is both limited and 
fragmented, with the most obvious shortcoming remaining the lack of a 
national Security Strategy that is relevant, coherent and congruent with the 
realities of the contemporary security environment.279    
 
Intrinsically linked to such expressions of dissonance, is a pervading sense 
of institutional inertia and approaching obsolescence that stems from the 
resistance to reform and undertake renewal. New Zealand’s national security 
institutions and frameworks that were principally designed to respond to 
relatively predictable geo-strategic patterns and threat-based trends, are 
appearing increasingly insufficient to manage the complexities of the modern 
bifurcated and globalised security environment. Indeed, as Ungerer further 
observes security institutions designed for another era “now seem slow and 
cumbersome in the face of new security challenges. Large departments of state 
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are often inward looking and fail to adapt quickly to the changes in the external 
security environment.”280  
 
The persistence of these conditions at the functional level within New 
Zealand’s security community is, again, culturally reflective of the narrow and 
somewhat dysfunctional and myopic institutional relationship between the 
ministries and agencies of state. To this end, if New Zealand is to determine its 
security requirements adequately over the next couple of decades, it must 
understand the forces driving strategic change. This will then enable the 
development of comprehensive and integrated policies that translate into 
sensible and sustainable security approaches. This requires innovative 
approaches to policy making, and also necessitates an end to the 
compartmentalised ‘silos’ within which much of New Zealand’s security policy 
is developed.281 This stands as further evidence of state-centrism and 
circumscribed policies which demonstrate institutional intransigence and 
prejudice, and an ‘opaque’ appreciation of the changed character and nuances 
of the contemporary security environment. It also underpins an institutional 
reluctance or unwillingness to consider and/or embrace alternative, 
increasingly relevant and ‘emancipatory’ security paradigms. 
 
A National Security Strategy for New Zealand 
While the National Security System provides a meaningful and worthwhile 
frame for conceptualisation of, and approach to security, addressing 
fundamental strategic culture and institutional limitations could be achieved 
through the establishment of a formalised and cohesive National Security 
Strategy for New Zealand. Any future New Zealand security strategy should 
reflect the state-human security dialectic, while seeking the coordination and 
integration of instruments of state and society, and correlate these with a 
seamless understanding of the contemporary security environment in which 
they should be contextually situated.  
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Necessarily, any such strategy must be comprehensive in its ‘means’ and 
‘ways’ and utilitarian in its ‘ends’ – understanding and accommodating the 
security needs of the state, individual and universal Humanity. Realising such 
an outcome, should necessarily focus on developing a holistic approach that 
strikes a balanced accord between respective ‘means, ways and ends’ equations 
applied to specific security incidents, issues or underlying themes. A unifying 
conception of this nature, and a unified understanding and vision of New 
Zealand’s security environment would facilitate interagency and ‘all-of-
government’ networks that engender institutional and cultural synergy and a 
truly national strategic focus. This would allow the New Zealand government 
to arrive at a more accurate assessment of the risks – and threats – to which 
both priority and resources must be afforded.282 Importantly, such outcomes 
should be derived from a sense of ‘shared understanding’ wherein each 
entity/institution engaged within New Zealand’s security system contributes a 
distinctive set of professional, technical, and cultural disciplines, values and 
perceptions. This broad basis of talent and perspective is central to realising a 
critical appreciation of security by providing breadth, depth and resilience to 
policy and program analysis, planning, execution and assessment; while 
contributing to the development of a common baseline on which risk 
assessments, judgements and decisions can be made. ‘Shared understanding’ in 
this respect, must be derived from a single, unambiguous and achievable 
touchstone for all security activity – the National Security Strategy.  
 
“The new security game for the 21st century requires a comprehensive 
approach and a long-term perspective if it is to begin to cope with the 
expanding security agenda.”283 Therefore, the realisation of a truly effective 
National Security Strategy for New Zealand will require fundamental reform of 
the nation’s approach to governance. As highlighted, addressing today’s array 
of security challenges requires governance techniques that are ‘anticipatory’ in 
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nature. To this end, the notion of ‘Anticipatory Governance’ as proposed by 
Feurth, may provide a sound basis for the cultural and institutional change 
required within New Zealand security. As Feurth describes,  
 
“Anticipatory governance is a system of institutional networks, rules, and norms that 
provides a way to use … networks … for the purpose of reducing risk and increasing 
capacity to respond to events at earlier rather than later stages of development.”284     
 
Indeed, so imperative is such a reform considered to understanding and 
addressing today’s security challenges, Ungerer argues persuasively that better 
coordination, inclusion and integration within national security communities 
could be achieved by making such networks the main functional design feature 
of national security strategies.285 Anticipatory Governance (AG) would provide 
New Zealand with the capacity to identify, understand and monitor complex 
security events and dynamics as they presented on the ‘horizon.’ Importantly, 
it would provide New Zealand’s security institutions with the ability to adjust 
rapidly to the interactions between security policy and problem. This sense of 
inherent agility within the AG system allows it to more effectively understand, 
interact and operate within complex and adaptive security environments and 
events, rather than traditional linear and threat-based frames. Presently, New 
Zealand’s prevailing security framework represents a legacy entrenched within 
increasingly outmoded 20th century concepts for organisation. This vertical 
mode of organisation (silos) is predicated on a traditional understanding of 
events and problems as linear rather than complex, adaptive and interactive. 
This form of governance significantly impedes a nation’s ability to deal with 
today’s complex challenges. As Feurth further contends  
 
“We have left a period when our most serious security problems were by nature 
stovepiped, when information about these problems was linear, and hierarchical 
management was sufficient. We have entered a period when the problems we face are 
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themselves networked: information about them is marked by complex interaction, and 
organization for dealing with them must be flattened and integrated286.  
 
The networking focus of AG offers New Zealand an alternative and more 
comprehensive way to organise its security governance. Networking deepens 
the sense of empowerment and broadens the mandate of operational levels to 
act in working towards broadly, but clearly stated strategy goals. In other 
words, a strategy-led networked approach seeks to achieve its security policy 
outcomes through a process of centralised coordination and control, and 
decentralised execution that is focussed towards responding to the security 
needs of the state and the individual. By adopting a networked approach – that 
reflects the same complex attributes and dynamics as the security environment 
it is interacting with – AG facilitates the establishment of a more precise 
understanding of each security challenge or risk, and allows for the 
formulation of more critically attuned and mature treatments that are 
appropriately resourced for success. Importantly, it should be acknowledged 
here that the NSS is not an explicit attempt to change from a completely silo-
based approach to security governance. Indeed, before the release of the NSS, 
cross-agency cooperation, even if imperfect and limited, has been a feature of 
New Zealand’s approach to security. The value of the NSS however, is derived 
from its establishment of a basis for normative conceptual and structural 
change - reforms that could be potentially delivered through the means of a 
formal National Security Strategy.      
 
Conclusions 
Creating a National Security Strategy and truly national approach to 
security for New Zealand is a daunting task, but it represents vital progress in 
understanding how to respond to today’s complex security challenges, while 
providing normative opportunity for conceiving of security in more critically 
meaningful and utilitarian ways for states, individuals and all humankind. In 
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addressing today’s security challenges, the need to understand, accommodate 
and reconcile the views, issues and needs of a mosaic of complex constituencies 
is itself, and intimidating challenge. Yet, deferring the problem is not an option 
for “we can be sure of one thing: the bifurcated security environment … will 
not disappear in the future. On the contrary, it is only likely to grow more 
complex and demanding.”287  
 
As this Chapter has highlighted, the continued absence of an integrated 
National Security Strategy for New Zealand risks a future of further 
institutional fragmentation, and a lack of policy, programmatic and operational 
coherence. Indeed, failure to achieve sound levels of community integration 
and coherence, underscored by a centralised strategy and control mechanism – 
potentially achieved through the adoption of a networked anticipatory 
governance approach – ultimately risks exacerbating measures of insecurity for 
the people and state of New Zealand. For, as Bell explains: 
 
“Without a broad understanding or overarching strategy, individual strategies will fail 
to be compatible with – and the capabilities acquired will fail to be interoperable with – 
other elements, both vertically with central government strategy and horizontally with 
other vulnerability and consequence management elements.”288    
 
While the NSS released in April 2011 represents key normative progress in 
New Zealand’s conception of, and approach to security, a formalised National 
Security Strategy – that necessarily reflects the state-human security dialectic, 
and critical and human security perspectives – must remain a compelling 
objective. The realisation of such a strategy is considered vital to ensuring that 
New Zealand is optimally prepared to confront the challenges of today’s 
bifurcated and globalised security environment; while reinforcing the ability 
and capacity of Government to fulfil its most fundamental of responsibilities –  
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safeguarding the compact between state and society, the individual citizen, and 
broader Humanity.   
 
 98
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
 The 20th Century was an age dominated by the legacy of devastating 
global wars, colonial and polarised ideological struggles and conflicts, and by 
efforts to establish international and local systems that would foster – liberal – 
peace, prosperity and security. Yet insecurity not only remains, it has become a 
primary development challenge of our time. Today, approximately one-and-a-
half billion people experience a life characterised by a combined range of 
traditional and truly modern security challenges that intensify human 
vulnerability and the fragility of societies and states, and international and 
‘global-social’ systems.289  
 
As Chapter 1 of this Thesis mapped out, today’s compounding security 
challenges are increasingly multidimensional, complex and adaptive, and 
inherently ‘social’ in character. Indeed, so expansive is the nature of the 
contemporary security environment and agenda that it is “stretching the 
boundaries of conventional thinking about security.”290 As a consequence, 
traditional security structures, systems and agencies are losing their relevance 
and resonance within contemporary settings. Crucially, they are proving ill-
suited or inadequate in understanding, explaining, and coping with the 
challenges of today’s transforming security environment, even when national 
or international interests or values have prompted action; and this will “require 
a substantially new manner of thinking if mankind is to survive.”291 In this 
respect, as I have demonstrated, effective contemporary approaches to security 
should necessarily “reflect the consequences of a globalised security 
environment that has bifurcated between an older state-centric world … and 
new [multi-centric] trans-state and sub-state strata.”292
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The extent to which these conditions underwrite the future will be central 
to framing security contexts of states and the international system, and 
individuals and universal humanity alike. Addressing the transformation of 
security is to recognise that transnational and localised phenomena are likely to 
become the more prominent causes of insecurity. The pressures of globalisation 
and bifurcation have instead been internalised and intensified within every 
society trying to adapt to the increasing rate of this change. Accordingly, the 
globalisation of security and bifurcation of the security environment have 
presented Humanity with the opportunity to fundamentally challenge and seek 
renewal within traditional security paradigms that necessarily requires an end 
to the narrow and binary framing of security within exclusively state-centric 
terms.  
 
In this respect, as I have argued: the core challenges at all levels of security 
– and our responses to them – are dialectic, and must be considered 
analogously and in accord, rather than through inimical approaches and 
frames. By considering security comprehensively, and in the larger context of 
contemporary environmental change “allows one to better understand both the 
current state of the field and its place in the academy, and to make suggestions 
as to how practitioners might rethink … the policy advice they suggest to the 
powerful.”293 To this end, my Thesis has demonstrated that the necessary 
starting point for an analysis of New Zealand’s future security programmatic 
and structural requirements is the external security environment shaped by the 
bifurcation and globalisation of security.294 In this respect, the transformative 
dynamics of the contemporary security environment and the effects of 
globalisation are conspiring to generate new contexts by which states such as 
New Zealand must understand, assess and respond to contemporary security 
imperatives. Accordingly, this will require a refocus of New Zealand’s 
“political logic of strategy, balancing a global-local nexus and blending the 
networked challenges of [bifurcated and] globalised security into a new policy 
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calculus for the 21st century.”295  Therefore, in the era of the globalisation of 
security; within the context of the  bifurcated security environment; and in our 
enduring search for ‘security’ and its meaning, we must continuously and 
critically retest and challenge the continued relevance and utility of prevailing 
theoretical and programmatic assumptions that shape our understanding and 
actions.  
 
In seeking to address the realities of the contemporary security 
environment, this Thesis has offered the idea that understanding and 
addressing (in)security within contemporary settings, requires us to critically 
focus, broaden and deepen our perspectives. Indeed, in the “strategic action 
undertaken to bring about change, there is no sounder basis than immanent 
critique to discover the latent potentials in situations on which to build political 
and social progress.296 To this end, critical approaches to security, such as 
human security – through processes of political and social emancipation – are 
committed to understanding and resolving the (in)security of real people in 
real places. Such approaches do so through the means of ‘critique’, which 
entails the exploration of what is ‘real’, and what is reliable knowledge. In 
applying critique, critical approaches stand outside the given frameworks and 
units of analysis they are exploring, and engage with concrete social and 
political issues, with the aim of maximising and optimising opportunities for 
enhancing security, community and emancipation, at individual and societal 
and state and international levels, and in the interests of universal Humanity. 
In this sense, as agents of structural, social and political emancipation, critical 
approaches derive much of their value and utility by drawing on a progressive 
and inclusive agenda that is at once broader, deeper and more focussed than 
state-centric security conceptions.  
 
The potency of critical approaches such as human security stems from the 
ability to illuminate those threat and vulnerability concerns which transcend 
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geopolitical borders, and structural, material notions of state power and 
interest. The argument here is that human security narratives not only provide 
space for the inclusion of a wider range of issues, [but they] allow us to focus 
on issues that have been occluded by previous state-centric security 
practices.297 Importantly though, unlike other critical conceptions, Human 
Security does so by neither delegitimizing nor devaluing the state. Rather, the 
critical utility of Human Security is derived from situating the state in 
contemporary settings where its relative value and relevance as a security 
referent and agent can be more accurately assessed and optimised.  
 
In many respects, the increasing recognition of the existence of this 
normative state-citizen (human) security compact, is reflective of the 
emergence of a utilitarian dialectic and via media between state and human 
security approaches which had been cast as hitherto inimical. The dialectic is 
between two referent objects – the state and people – wherein these two 
‘organisms’ assume the status moral and political equivalency and 
indivisibility. It recognises that although security is the objective of individuals, 
it can only be achieved through collective political and social processes. 
Correspondingly, it acknowledges that the state – and state sovereignty – must 
serve and support the people from which it draws its legitimacy.  
 
The apparent promise therefore, is that the conceptual and practical utility 
inherent in, and derived from the notions of dialectic and via media, might 
then lead to positive transformations within our security thinking and 
frameworks. At best, it might result in a new normative synthesis of critical 
understanding and comprehensive cooperation between state and human 
approaches to security through the establishment of a dynamic via media that 
adjusts subject to the relative security context or need. Importantly, in doing so, 
it is hoped that security conceived in such a way, will contribute to an on-going 
critical evolution in New Zealand’s understanding of, and approach to, 
security. This will be realised by promoting a truly comprehensive approach 
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that conceives security as an instrumental value which promotes a more 
inclusive and integrative humanity; and that correspondingly refocuses New 
Zealand’s security institutions from their almost exclusive focus and continuing 
preoccupation with nationalist identity and statist orthodoxies which promote 
the somewhat binary idea of security against others. 
 
Consequently, in April of 2011, New Zealand released its first truly 
comprehensive and ‘national’ statement on security for the 21st Century, and 
within an era marked by the bifurcation and globalisation of security. The 
document is, in many respects, an expression of the nation’s vision, values and 
aspirations for the ensuing millennium. It represents the emergence of a 
somewhat normative and critically inspired transformation in contemporary 
thinking, understanding and practice within New Zealand’s security 
community. Crucially though, the statement (re)establishes – in both tacit and 
explicit ways – the fundamental compact between the state, society and 
individual, and the emerging dialectic between state and human securities. 
Crucially, it establishes a critical basis from which New Zealand’s security 
community can overcome its cultural and institutional ‘tyranny of dissonance’. 
Yet, while the NSS represents quantum progress in New Zealand’s conception 
of, and approach to security, particularly in respect to its increasing 
consideration and accommodation of critical and human security perspectives, 
a formalised National Security Strategy must remain a compelling objective. 
The realisation of such a strategy is considered vital to ensuring that New 
Zealand is optimally prepared to confront the challenges of today’s bifurcated 
and globalised security environment. 
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